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IN SEARCH OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT:
DOES LIHPRHA RESTRICT STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM
PRESERVING AFFORDABLE HOUSING?
Michael Freedman∗
INTRODUCTION
During the past twenty-five years, the federal government has
reduced its role in maintaining the nation’s affordable housing
supply,1 shifting the burden of housing America’s poor to state and
local governments.2 From the New-Deal era through the 1970s, the
∗
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1
Affordable housing refers to housing intended for “low-income” or “very
low-income” people. Families with incomes less than eighty percent of the area
median income are considered “low-income.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(b)(2) (2002).
Families with incomes less than fifty percent of the area median income are
considered “very low-income.” Id.
2
Roger K. Lewis, Free-Market Housing Programs Come Up Short as
Affordability Gap Widens With Age; Shaping the City, WASH. POST, Oct. 30,
1999, at G10; Wayne Washington, White House Starts Shift of Housing Burden
to States HUD Spokesmen Cite Delays in Using U.S. Aid, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
14, 2003, at A3; Glenn Thrush & Graham Rayman, Housing Sees Cuts in
Budget; Bush Administration Proposals Would Mean as Much as $200M Less
for Low-Income Vouchers, Subsidies, NEWSDAY (New York), Feb. 9, 2005, at
A07; Tim May, Low-Income Rentals Threatened as Vote Looms in U.S. Senate;
Housing: Affordability Rents and Efforts by Tenants to Own Their Buildings
May Hinge on Fate of Some Federal Subsidies. Los Angeles Could Be Hit
Particularly Hard, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at B1; David W. Chen, HUD Aid
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federal government played a major role in providing affordable
housing to the nation’s poor and low-income communities through
the creation of large, project-based subsidy programs that provided
incentives to owners to build and maintain affordable housing
projects.3 During the 1960s and 1970s, more than two million units
were built under project-based programs.4 Starting with the Reagan
Administration, however, federal housing policies began to reflect
a preference for letting the market address housing demands by
providing subsidies directly to tenants through housing vouchers,
while preserving and rehabilitating the existing stock of affordable
projects.5 Housing policies shifted further throughout the Clinton
Administration, during which the federal government eliminated
funding for the development of affordable housing projects and for
preservation incentives.6 The current administration is attempting
Short by $50 Million, City Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at B5; Hillary
Stout, Housing Subsidies in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1988, at sec. 8, 1; Ann
Mariano, Housing Policy Faces New Challenges; Low-Income Programs Seen
Threatened, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1985, at G1 (“Five years ago, housing the
poor was high on the list of national priorities, the fastest-growing federal
subsidy program of the decade. . . . But little more than a year ago, with the
election of Ronald Reagan, all that began to change.”).
3
Alfred M. Clark, III, Can America Afford to Abandon a National Housing
Policy?, 6 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMM. DEV. L. 185, 185 (1997) (citing the
Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1452b (repealed 1990)); see also Peter
Salinas, Toward a Permanent Housing Problem, No. 95 Public Interest 22-23
(1986), reprinted in CHARLES E. DAYE ET AL., HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT 14 (3d ed. 1999). Under these programs, private owners
contracted with the federal government to receive subsidies in return for keeping
rents affordable for low-income income tenants. Id. The term “project” is
sometimes used in reference to government owned and operated public housing.
“Project” in this note generically refers to any affordable housing development.
In addition to federal housing efforts, virtually every state and most larger
cities have agencies dedicated to the housing the poor. Id. State and local efforts
act as both conduits for federal assistance and supplement local efforts. Id.
4
Clark, supra note 3, at 187.
5
Michael Grunwald, Further Cuts Feared in Housing for the Poor;
Menino Says City Needs Game Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1995, at 1 (“The
federal government has not built much affordable housing since 1980, but it has
left intact and often rehabilitated the existing stock.”); see also Mariano, supra
note 2.
6
HUD’s Flawed Blueprint, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 1995, at 10; Grunwald,
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to completely sever any ties between the federal government and
low-income tenants by providing housing funds directly to state
governments through block grants, along with the responsibility
for administering federal housing programs.7
The transfer to the states of responsibility for the creation and
maintenance of affordable housing has occurred largely with
Congress’s consent.8 State and local governments, however, are
supra note 5 (“Clinton’s plan to overhaul HUD to free cities and states from its
oversight and to increase choice for low-income tenants could chip away at that
stock, HUD officials conceded.”) (quoting Sue Marsh, executive director of the
Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless).
7
Thrush & Rayman, supra note 2; Steve Twedt, The Fraying Safety Net,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Pennsylvania), Mar. 27, 2005, at A10; Ron
Nissimov, City Moving Quickly to Spend Block Grant Money; Funds Not Used
by May 1 Are at Risk of Being Lost, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 25, 2005, at B5;
Jocelyn Y. Stewart, U.S. Blamed in Cuts to Rental Aid for Poor; Changes to
Housing Program Will Lead to Higher Costs, Canceled Contracts, Critics Say,
L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at B1. Unfortunately, federal funding of block grants
for housing falls short of the amount promised to participants in current voucher
programs and is insufficient to maintain the programs’ effectiveness. David W.
Chen, U.S. Is Asked to Increase Housing Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at B1
(“New York City officials say their projected share of federal funds for lowincome housing vouchers is more than $61 million short of what is needed . . . .
In all, 492 out of an estimated 2,500 housing agencies that issue vouchers have
asked for more money.”).
8
See Paulette J. Williams, Special Series: Developing Sustainable Urban
Communities: The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: Systemic Issues
Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 455 (2004).
The story of affordable housing development during the 1980s is a
story of disinvestment by the federal government, devolution of the
responsibility for housing upon state and local government, and an
increasing sense that the private enterprise with government subsidies
could do a better job of addressing the continuing crisis than
government did at any level.
Id.; Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance:
The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 907-16 (1990)
(advocating a market-based approach to the availability of public housing based
on the availability of maximal tenant choice and the use of vouchers to obtain
private housing).
The federal government has abandoned commitments in a variety of social
welfare contexts, creating new challenges for state and local governments, and
also new opportunities for the private market, primarily non-for-profit
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not prepared, nor are they able, to take over where the federal
government left off. Budgetary challenges limit the ability of state
and local governments to develop new affordable housing projects
and force states to turn to their most controversial housing
regulations, including rent control and eminent domain, to preserve
a small but important stock of permanent affordable housing.9
organizations. See generally John J. Ammann & Peter W. Salsich, Jr.,
Symposium: Nonprofit Housing Providers: Can They Survive the “Devolution
Revolution”?, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 321 (1997) (discussing a widening
role for nonprofits in the development of affordable housing policy).
The “devolution revolution,” as exemplified by the 1996 welfare
reform legislation, has created major uncertainties for housing and
homeless services providers. How the states will respond to new
responsibilities that are accompanied by fewer resources is a matter of
conjecture at the moment. As welfare reform begins to be implemented,
it is increasingly clear that it will have major impact on housing policy.
Low-income families may be able to accept “a new social contract that
expects and rewards work and responsible behavior” in return for help
in finding jobs, protecting children and escaping poverty.
Id. at 352.
9
David W. Chen, Bill on Affordable Housing Sets Up Sides for a Debate,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at B5. See generally William A. Fishel & Perry
Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic
Interpretations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988),
reprinted in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW
514 (2d ed. 1995).
State and local governments have used alternative means of developing
efficient, low-cost solutions to the growing affordable housing crisis. New York
City’s Tenant Empowerment Act: Hearing on Intro. No. 186 and Proposed Res.
No. 388-A Before the Committee on Housing and Buildings of the Council of the
City of New York (Oct. 28, 2004) (statement of James Grow, Esq., National
Housing Law Project) [hereinafter Grow]. These measures seek to reinstitute the
key “component of the federal preservation policy for HUD-subsidized
properties that the federal government abandoned since 1995—that preservation
is of sufficient importance to warrant restrictions on owner conversion, so long
as those restrictions are supported with market-value compensation.” Id. at 6.
While the over the direction of American housing policy continues, this
note assumes that, at the present time, the free-market is unable solve the
immediate needs of the nearly two million families that will be forced to
relocate if current privately-owned subsidized affordable housing projects
remove affordability restrictions. See, e.g., Peter Dreier, The New Politics of
Housing, 63 J. OF THE AM. PLANNING ASS’N 5 (1997), reprinted in DAYE, supra
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Further, in their efforts to maintain the rapidly diminishing
affordable housing stock, state and local legislatures have
encountered difficulty in determining the scope of their authority
with respect to housing, given the uncertain application of a single
provision within a much larger federal statute—the Low Income
Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990
(LIHPRHA or the Preservation Act).10
Programs for privately owned, federally subsidized housing
projects, under forty-year subsidized mortgages, originally
permitted developers to free themselves of affordability restrictions
after twenty years.11 LIHPRHA set forth a number of federal
preservation policies intended to protect low-income tenants from
profit-motivated owners seeking to convert their federally
subsidized housing projects to market-rate units.12 The
Preservation Act and its predecessor, the Emergency Low-Income
Housing Preservation Act of 1987,13 created a burdensome process
for converting federal affordable housing projects to market-rate
units (“opting out”), including a requirement that owners provide
findings that low-income tenants would not be adversely impacted
by the conversion of the regulated properties.14 This high threshold
note 3, at 7; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 480 (4th ed.
1992).
10
Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of
1990, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4125 (1996) [hereinafter LIHPRHA]. See also New
York City’s Tenant Empowerment Act: Hearing on Intro. No. 186 and Proposed
Res. No. 388-A Before the Committee on Housing and Buildings of the Council
of the City of New York (Oct. 28, 2004) (statement of Prof. Paula Franzese, Esq.,
Seton Hall School of Law) (examining federal preemption of a proposed New
York City preservation law) [hereinafter Franzese] (on file with author).
11
See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
12
12 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4125. David Etezadi & Peter Manzo, LIHPRHA:
Great Opportunity for Community Control, 4 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMM.
DEV. L. 67 (1994-1995).
13
Emergency Low-Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987, 12 U.S.C. §
1715l (1989 & Supp. 1995).
14
See LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101, 4102(a), 4107, 4108. Under
LIHPRHA’s prepayment procedures, an owner first had to file with HUD,
tenants, and others a “notice of intent” to prepay. Id. § 4102(a). The owner then
was required to submit a plan of action (POA) setting forth information relating
to the proposed prepayment. Id. § 4107. HUD would then evaluate the owner’s
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essentially prohibited owners from prepaying forty-year mortgages
and from opting out of their respective federal housing programs
after the twenty years.15 Owners were protected under LIHPRHA,
however, from additional burdens imposed by state or local
governments through a preemption provision that prohibited states
from further restricting the prepayment of mortgages subsidized by
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).16 This provision is codified in section 4122 of Title 12 of
the United States Code (Section 4122).
Facing budget concerns, Congress began to remove the
preservation restrictions in 1996 through various appropriations
acts. The first of these, the Housing Opportunity Program
Extension Act (HOPE),17 provided owners seeking to opt out an
alternative to LIHPRHA.18 Under HOPE, owners were able to opt
out of federal housing programs without HUD’s consent so long as
they agreed to not increase rents for sixty days.19 The question
remained, however, whether LIHPRHA’s preemption provision
would protect buildings opting out under HOPE’s terms from state
or local preservation initiatives. HOPE contains no preemption
provision, nor does it refer to LIHPRHA’s preemption provision.20
Indeed, there is no language in either of the respective statutes
POA for approval. Id. § 4101(a). Under the Act, HUD could issue such approval
for prepayment only after making certain written findings that the prepayment
would not adversely affect the low-income housing supply or involuntarily
displace current tenants. Id. §§ 4101(a), 4108.
15
Arthur R. Hessel & Susan Sturman, Heard From HUD: LIHPRHA
Comes Full Circle, 5 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMM. DEV. L. 316, 318 (1996).
16
12 U.S.C. § 4122.
17
Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104120, § 2(b), 110 Stat. 834 (1996) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 4101 note (1996))
[hereinafter HOPE].
18
See Kenneth Arms Tenant Ass’n v. Martinez, No. CIV. S-01-832, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *13 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (“The Housing Opportunity
Program Extension Act of 1996 . . . permitted mortgage prepayment without
HUD’s approval.”).
19
See infra note 74.
20
Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 11470, at *26 (holding that HOPE
does not contain a preemption provision and when owners are involved with the
HOPE prepayment scheme, LIHPRHA’s preemption provision does not apply).
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directly discussing the relationship between and interplay of HOPE
and LIHPRHA.
Two recent cases considering the applicability of LIHPRHA’s
preemption provision to HOPE’s prepayment provisions
demonstrate the confusion surrounding this issue. The Eighth
Circuit, in Forest Park II v. Hadley,21 and the Ninth Circuit, in
Topa Equities v. City of Los Angeles,22 examined two principal
questions: (1) whether the LIHPRHA preemption provision applies
to buildings opting out under HOPE’s prepayment schedule; and
(2) whether the LIHPRHA provision preempts the respective
Minnesota and California preservation statute challenged in the
cases.23 Both courts agreed that, despite the defunding of
LIHPRHA, the Act’s preemption provision is applicable to
HOPE’s prepayment schedule because of the plain meaning of
LIHPRHA’s preemption provision and the state laws’ apparent
effect of regulating HUD.24 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits reached
conflicting holdings with respect to the second issue.25 The Eighth
Circuit employed a “practical effects” analysis, under which all
state or local preservation laws that have the effect of limiting or
delaying owners’ expectations of converting their affordable
housing projects to market rates are preempted.26 By contrast, the
Ninth Circuit employed a “legal consequences” test, under which
laws that “restrict or inhibit” the prepayment of federally
subsidized mortgages are preempted.27 The result is that state or
local laws (e.g., rent control regulations) in the Eighth Circuit that
restrict owners from realizing the potential gains from market-rate
rents following opt out are preempted, while those in the Ninth
Circuit, according to the court in Topa Equities, are not.
21

Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2003), reh’g and reh’g
en banc denied (2003).
22
Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.
2003).
23
Id. at 1067; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 727.
24
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732.
25
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 733. See also
Independence Park Apts. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 692, 704 (2004).
26
Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 733.
27
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070.
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The courts’ holdings in Forest Park and Topa Equities will
have direct consequences for whether current programs, which
increasingly are being administered by states, can continue to meet
“the critical and growing needs of lower-income Americans for
decent and affordable housing.”28 Nationwide, more than four and
a half million seniors, people with disabilities, and families with
low incomes live in federally subsidized affordable housing rental
units.29
In examining the application of LIHPRHA’s preemption
provision to buildings opting out under HOPE and other alternative
prepayment provisions, this note argues that the circuit courts
incorrectly adopted a plain meaning approach to the interpretation
of LIHPRHA’s preemption provision. In this case, preemption
jurisprudence dictates that ambiguous statutory language should be
interpreted in light of the relevant legislative history and the
underlying purpose and structure of the statutes. Indeed, a review
of the legislative purpose and history of LIHPRHA and the past
practice of HUD lead to the conclusion that LIHPRHA’s
preemption provision should not apply to buildings opting out
under HOPE.
Part I of this note examines the background of federal policies
regarding the development and preservation of affordable housing
projects. Part II discusses current state and local affordable housing
preservation policies. Part III examines Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding constitutional preemption standards. Part
IV analyzes the holdings of Forest Park30 and Topa Equities.31
Part V.A examines the debate about whether LIHPRHA’s
preemption provision should be applied to alternative prepayment
processes such as HOPE. This part highlights the circuit courts’
28

Grow, supra note 9, at 3. These units represent more than one-third of
our country’s subsidized housing inventory. Id.
29
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., RENTAL HOUSING DYNAMICS: IS
AFFORDABLE HOUSING FOR THE POOR AND ENDANGERED SPECIES? (2003),
available at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/ahs/ahsReports.html#2. U.S. DEP’T
OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., THE WIDENING GAP: NEW FINDINGS ON HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY IN AMERICA (1997).
30
Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 733.
31
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070.
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reliance on a plain meaning approach to the interpretation of the
LIHPRHA preemption provision, as compared to the broad
approach suggested by affordable housing advocates, who argue
that the interpretation of LIHPRHA requires the use of a range of
sources, including legislative history, and agency policy and
practice. Part V.B proposes that if courts continue to apply the
LIHPRHA preemption provision to HOPE or other prepayment
statutes, then constitutional preemption jurisprudence and
congressional history support the use of the Ninth Circuit’s legal
consequences test rather than the Eighth Circuit’s practical effects
approach. Part VI recommends that state and local governments
interested in preserving their privately owned, federally subsidized
affordable housing should enact preservation laws that enable and
aid the transfer of such properties to non-speculative preservation
owners following the current owners’ opting-out of federal
affordable housing programs.
I. BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AND
PRESERVATION POLICIES
Since 1949, the priority of U.S. housing policy has been to
achieve “a decent home and suitable living environment for every
American family.”32 The National Housing Act of 194933
employed an approach that was unique among New Deal-era
policies in enticing private industry to aid the implementation of a
government initiative.34 Through below-market interest rate loans
32

Salinas, supra note 3, at 22-23. In pursuit of the objectives of the
Housing Act of 1949, the national government subsidized construction of 1.2
million new low-income apartments, 800,000 new apartments for moderateincome families, and 700,000 new apartments for the elderly. Id. Adding more
than 1.5 million rent supplements per year and other subsidy programs, the
federal government has subsidized more than 5 million households with new or
rehabilitated housing units since 1950. Id.
33
42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949) [hereinafter National Housing Act of 1949].
34
Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Will the “Free Market” Solve the Affordable
Housing Crisis?, J. OF POVERTY L. AND POL’Y, Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 573
(explaining how the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, which created the federal public
housing program, created programs designed to construct and manage housing
projects in order to provide homes but also in major part to help the country
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and general subsidies, federal housing programs provided
incentives to private developers to build inexpensive housing.35
In 1961, Congress enacted a below-market interest rate
program (Section 221(d)(3)),36 which was later replaced in 1968 by
an interest subsidy program (Section 236).37 Under Section
221(d)(3) and Section 236, HUD was authorized to insure loans
made by private lending institutions and to subsidize interest
payments on loans extended to profit-motivated developers.38
Through subsidies, HUD reduced the interest rates of private
market mortgages (usually about eight to ten percent) to between
one and three percent, and offered developers the option of
extending mortgage loans for the construction period plus forty
years.39 Owners were expected to share the benefits of the program
with tenants through lower rents.40
In exchange for favorable financing terms, owners of Section
221(d)(3) and 236 housing projects were required to comply with
certain minimum property standards and to maintain the housing
for occupancy by low-income families.41 Mortgage documents for
projects under these sections prohibited project owners from
prepaying their forty-year mortgages for a period of twenty years
without HUD’s prior consent.42 This restriction prevented owners
come out of the Great Depression by creating new construction jobs); Angela D.
Chatman, Housing Cuts; Restructuring HUD Will Shred the Safety Net for the
Poor. But the Pain Will Be Shared by All, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio),
Mar. 26, 1995, at 1C.
35
Salsich, supra note 34, at 576.
36
National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1961).
37
Id. § 1715z-1 (1968).
38
Sheldon Winkelman, Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident
Homeownership Act of 1990, 73 MICH. B.J. 1160, 1160 (1994).
39
Id.
40
See Cienega Gardens v. United States, 194 F.3d 1231, 1234 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied sub nom. Sherman Park Apartments v. United States, 528
U.S. 820 (1999).
41
Winkelman, supra note 38, at 1160.
42
Cienega Gardens, 194 F.3d at 1234-35.
Generally, when obtaining a HUD-insured mortgage under either of
the above programs, an owner executed a deed of trust note payable to
a private lending institution. The note evidenced a loan made to the
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from escaping the low-income housing limitations and use
restrictions during this period.43
Despite the government’s efforts to generate and maintain
affordable housing through the Section 221(d)(3), Section 236, and
Section 8 project-based programs, America’s affordable housing
needs remained substantially unmet.44 Many of the projects built
owner pursuant to a loan agreement between the owner and the lending
institution that contemplated advances to the owner. Payment of the
indebtedness evidenced by the note was secured by a deed of trust, or a
mortgage, on the subject property. The note and deed of trust were
printed on forms approved by HUD, and HUD endorsed the note as
part of its mortgage insurance. The repayment term of the loan was
generally forty years. Simultaneously, in exchange for HUD’s
endorsement for insurance (pursuant to a commitment for insurance),
the owner entered into a regulatory agreement with HUD, under which
the owner agreed, among other things, to certain “affordability
restrictions,” including restrictions on the income levels of tenants,
restrictions on allowable rental rates, and restrictions on the rate of
return the owner could receive from the housing project. The regulatory
agreement and the mortgage insurance provided by HUD were to
remain in effect so long as the loan remained outstanding.
While the regulatory agreement made no mention of the right to
prepay the outstanding loan, a rider to the deed of trust note permitted
the owner to prepay the loan in full, without HUD approval, after
twenty years. Developers could not prepay their loans prior to twenty
years, except under certain conditions, including HUD approval. The
prepayment rules in the riders reflected contemporaneous HUD
regulations governing the Section 221(d)(3) and Section 236 programs.
By prepaying the outstanding loan, an owner could terminate HUD’s
affordability restrictions on the property. The owner then could convert
the property into a conventional rental property and charge market
rental rates, thereby obtaining a greater return on the investment.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
43
Id. at 1235.
44
Grow, supra note 9, at 2. Throughout the 1970s, projects under Sections
221(d)(3) and 236 suffered large operating losses, as rents remained static
despite increasing maintenance costs. Id. In response, Congress supplied
additional subsidies in the form of Section 8 Loan Management Set-Aside
contracts, commonly known as Section 8 Housing Assistance Payment (HAP)
contracts. See Henry A. Herrman, Comment, Privity: How HUD Avoided
Contract Liability under ELIHPA and LIHPRHA, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 323, 329
(2001). Section 8 subsidies originally provided direct payments to owners of
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under these programs quickly fell into disrepair due to the projects’
failure to generate sufficient “revenue to keep pace with rising
operating, management, and maintenance costs.”45 Attempting to
address the deficiencies of its project-based tenant subsidy
programs, Congress subsequently developed a tenant-based
Section 8 voucher program that largely replaced project-based
subsidy programs.46 As a result, appropriations under Sections
221(d)(3) and 236 stopped.47 However, the approximately 800,000
units built under these programs continued in operation pursuant to
the twenty-year prepayment restriction.48
In the mid-1980s, more than 800,000 units built under Sections
221(d)(3) and 236 were still held under federal rent prohibitions
and remained an important part of the nation’s affordable housing
stock. Congress became concerned that a significant portion of this
pool could be lost through conversion to market-rate units because
the twenty-year restriction on prepayment for most of the
properties would soon expire.49 Upon prepayment, “the units
would no longer be restricted to low-income occupancy.”50
Because in most cases local rents for comparable properties
exceeded the rents earned by assisted housing units, the owners of
these units could increase their profits by converting properties to
market-rate rents or condominium status.51 Conversions of both
types threatened the same result—the removal from the market of
affordable housing for low-income tenants.
section 236 projects to supplement the rent payable by low-income tenants and
to offset operating costs for the projects. Clark, supra note 3, at 187-88.
45
Herrman, supra note 44, at 329.
46
Id. at 187-88. For a discussion of section 8 subsidies, see DAYE, supra
note 3, at 210-20; see also Brian Maney & Sheila Cowley, Scarcity and Success:
Perspectives on Assisted Housing, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMM. DEV. L.
319 (2000).
47
Clark, supra note 3, at 187.
48
Id.
49
C. Theodore Koebel & Cara L. Bailey, State Policies and Program to
Preserve Federally Assisted Low-Income Housing, 3 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE,
995, 995-96 (1990) (citing John Moore, Expiring Uses, NAT’L J., Aug. 2, 1986,
at 1184-88).
50
Id.
51
Id. See also Grow, supra note 9, at 4.
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The prospect that nearly one million units of low-income
housing built during the 1960s would soon become eligible to be
released from rent restrictions prompted Congress to enact the
Emergency Low-Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987
(Emergency Act).52 The Emergency Act prohibited owners of
projects eligible for prepayment from converting these properties
to market-rate units unless they first complied with cumbersome
provisions.53 The Emergency Act effectively placed a moratorium
on prepayment by owners of their Section 221(d)(3) and 236
housing development loans at the end of the original twenty-year
period.54 Owners, outraged at the sudden abrogation of their
contractual rights, filed lawsuits challenging the constitutionality
of the Emergency Act.55
52

Emergency Low-Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987, 12 U.S.C. §
1715l (1989 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter ELIHPA]. See also Johnson v. United
States Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 911 F.2d 1302, 1305 (8th Cir. 1990)
(citing H.R.CONF.REP. No. 426, 100th Cong., reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3458, 3489-3790).
The Preservation Act was prompted by the prospect that nearly one
million units of low income housing built in the 1960s would soon be
eligible to be released from rent restrictions because of the expiration of
the twenty-year moratorium on unilateral mortgage prepayment and the
expiration of Section 8 rental assistance contracts. To prevent a national
crisis in the availability of low income housing, Congress passed a
temporary measure making it more difficult for owners of § 221(d)(3)
housing to release themselves from the terms of the regulatory
agreement.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
53
Koebel & Bailey, supra note 49, at 996.
54
Winkelman, supra note 38, 1160. See also Clark, supra note 3, at 189
(explaining that Congress passed ELIHPA as emergency legislation, intending
government and private industry to work together in developing permanent
solutions to the impending disaster of losing nearly 800,000 affordable housing
units).
55
ELIHPA was controversial because many owners believed that the terms
of the Act breached the federal government’s agreement to free the owners from
rent and land use restrictions. Howard Cohen & Taylor Mattis, Prepayment
Rights: Abrogation by the Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident
Homeownership Act of 1990, 28 REAL PROP. & TR. J. 1 (1993). Under
federal
project-based subsidy programs of the National Housing Act, the private
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While these suits were pending, Congress repealed the
Emergency Act and enacted the National Affordable Housing Act,
including the Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident
Homeownership Act of 1990 (LIHPRHA or Preservation Act).56
LIHPRHA established a comprehensive program to recapitalize
privately-owned assisted housing and to commit these properties
for use as low-income housing for their “remaining useful life” of
fifty years.57 To effectuate this goal, LIHPRHA encouraged
owners to refinance their units under the program58 or to sell their
developer secured a loan from a private lender, evidenced by a deed of trust note
payable to a private lending institution (the “Note”). Cienega Gardens v. United
States, 33 Fed. Cl. 196, 196-203 (1995). HUD endorsed the Note as part of its
process of insuring the mortgage. Id. The Note contained a rider, which
expressly permitted the owner to prepay the loan in full, without HUD approval,
after twenty years. Cienega Gardens, 194 F.3d at 1235. The rider was the only
document that expressly mentioned the borrower’s right to prepay. Id. Pursuant
to the rider, developers were not permitted to prepay their HUD-insured loans
prior to twenty years except under certain conditions. Id. Owners argued that
Congress had interfered with their contractual right of prepayment. See
Herrman, supra note 44, at 330 n.66 (citing Orrego v. 833 W. Buena Joint
Ventura, 943 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding ELIHPA not retroactive without
reaching the constitutional question); Thetford Properties v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 907 F.2d 445, 450 (4th Cir. 1990) (dismissing appellant’s
constitutional claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Johnson v.
U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 911 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1990) (dismissing
plaintiffs’ claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Orrego v. U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 701 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
56
LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4147. LIHPRHA was part of a more
comprehensive housing law called the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12701-12898 (1996). See generally Winkelman,
supra note 38, at 1161.
57
LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4112(c). “[T]he term ‘remaining useful life’
means. . . the period during which the physical characteristics of the housing
remain in a condition suitable for occupancy, assuming normal maintenance and
repairs are made and major systems and capital components are replaced as
becomes necessary.” Id. Fifty years after the commencement of the POA, the
owner may petition HUD for a hearing to determine whether the useful life of
the project has expired. Id.
58
Koebel & Bailey, supra note 49, at 997 (“LIHPRHA preservation
incentives include insured or direct capital improvement financing, an equity
takeout loan, an 8 percent return on preservation equity, access to reserves,
increased Section 8 and non-Section 8 rents, and insured acquisition loans and
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properties to “qualified purchasers.”59 With the hope of attracting
willing owners, LIHPRHA offered a range of incentives, including
increased rent ceilings, increased allowable rates of return on
investments, and equity loan funds for capital improvements.60
LIHPRHA specifically addressed the contested contractual
issues raised by the Emergency Act by permitting owners to
prepay their mortgage loans; however, the Act discouraged the
widespread exercise of this option through the creation of a
burdensome approval process.61 Under the Act’s prepayment
procedures, an owner first had to file with HUD, tenants, and
others a “notice of intent” to prepay.62 The owner then was
required to submit a “plan of action” (POA) setting forth
information relating to the proposed prepayment.63 HUD would
then evaluate the owner’s POA for approval.64 Under the
Preservation Act, HUD could issue approval for prepayment only
after making certain written findings that the prepayment would
not adversely affect the low-income housing supply or
involuntarily displace current tenants.65 In the event that HUD
could not make the necessary findings, LIHPRHA required that the
agency disapprove the owner’s POA and deny the owner’s request
for prepayment approval.66
grants to qualified purchasers.”).
59
Id.
“Qualified purchaser” is a technical term in the act identifying either a
priority purchaser as previously defined or another purchaser
committing to continuation of the units as assisted housing. Priority
purchasers include a local or state government agency, a nonprofit
housing corporation, or a tenant organization. For-profit buyers are
eligible as qualified purchasers if they are willing to commit to the use
restriction.
Id.
60
Cienega Gardens, 194 F.3d at 1235.
61
See LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4147.
62
Id. § 4102(a).
63
Id. § 4107.
64
Id. § 4101(a).
65
Id. §§ 4101(a), 4108. See also Forest Park, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
66
Id. § 4108(c). Under LIHPRHA’s stringent procedures, the prepayment
option was effectively limited to situations in which (1) there was no bona fide
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Under the market conditions of the mid-1990s, few owners
could reasonably satisfy the Preservation Act’s requirements for
prepayment.67 Further, the properties of many owners were
insufficiently valuable to qualify for additional financial incentives
under the Act. Therefore, most “eligible” owners did not to
participate in LIHPRHA at all.68 Of the owners that did participate,
virtually all filed POAs seeking preservation incentives to remain
in the affordable housing program.69
While Congress intended to burden owners with additional
federal restrictions through the Preservation Act, it also sought to
protect them from additional burdens imposed by state or local
governments. Section 4122 of LIHPRHA expressly preempted
state and local governments from establishing or enforcing laws or
regulations that would “restrict or prohibit” the prepayment of
loans on LIHPRHA-eligible housing projects.70 By its terms,
purchaser for the owner’s property, (2) there was insufficient public funding to
implement preservation, or (3) the owner’s POA was supported by sufficient
negative impact findings by HUD. Winkelman, supra note 38, at 1161-62.
An owner who wishes to prepay must file a notice of intent to do so,
simultaneously with HUD as well as with the appropriate state or local
government officer, the holder of the existing mortgage and the tenants.
HUD’s permission to prepay is only granted if the project fits into one
of two categories, namely: The project must be located in an area where
there is no need for low-income housing and where there will be no
substantial economic effect on the tenants; or the project must have a
value so high that the amount of federal incentives which must be
offered (“Federal Cost Limits”) cannot support the appraised value of
the property. It is generally felt that it would require an extremely
unique set of facts and circumstances to lead to HUD’s granting
permission for prepayment; that is, all areas arguably need low-income
housing and very few projects have a value greater than the Federal
Cost Limits. Therefore, the option of prepayment is probably a fiction.
Id.
67
Winkelman, supra note 38 (citing Thetford Properties, 907 F.2d at 450)
(“[T]he option of prepayment is probably a fiction . . . .”).
68
Id. See also Grow, supra note 9, at 3.
69
LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4109.
70
Id. § 4122. In relevant part, the statute reads:
(a) In general. No State or political subdivision of a State may
establish, continue in effect, or enforce any law or regulation that . . .
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Section 4122 did not apply to local laws of general applicability.71
The Preservation Act, along with its express preemption provision,
ensured affordable housing for the most at-risk low-income
Americans, while providing equitable treatment of federally
funded incentives among the states. 72
In the late 1990s, an emerging interest in balancing the national
budget, coupled with HUD’s promotion of its “Reinvention
Blueprint”—a radical proposal to substitute vouchers for all
project-based assistance—led to Congress’s defunding of the
Preservation Act and the creation of a series of new programs to
address the low-income housing shortage.73 Congress mandated
(1) restricts or inhibits the prepayment of any mortgage described in
section 4119(1) of this title . . . on eligible low income housing; (2)
restricts or inhibits an owner of such housing from receiving the
authorized annual return provided under section 4101 of this title; (3) is
inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, including any law,
regulation, or other restriction that limits or impairs the ability of any
owner of eligible low income housing to receive incentives authorized
under this subchapter . . . or (4) in its applicability to low income
housing is limited only to eligible low income housing for which the
owner has prepaid the mortgage or terminated the insurance
contract . . .
(b) Effect. This section shall not prevent the establishment, continuing
in effect, or enforcement of any law or regulation of any State or
political subdivision of a State not inconsistent with the provisions of
this subchapter, such as any law or regulation relating to building
standards, zoning limitations, health, safety, or habitability standards
for housing, rent control, or conversion or rental housing to
condominium or cooperative ownership, to the extent such law or
regulation is of general applicability to both housing receiving Federal
assistance and nonassisted housing . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
71
Id.
72
H.R.CONF.REP. No. 101-943, at 458, 460 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6070, 6165 [hereinafter House LIHPRHA Report] (“Preemption:
The [LIHPRHA] solution would recognize that a fair Federal preservation
policy must apply uniformly to all affected properties regardless of location. For
that reason, the solution would preempt State and Local laws that target only
prepayment projects for special treatment.”).
73
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 729. See Grow, supra note 9, at 3. While not
endorsing HUD’s proposal, in 1996, Congress reduced funding for the
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that, effective October 1, 1996, HUD suspend processing of any
unapproved POAs under LIHPRHA.74 As a practical matter,
LIHPRHA’s restrictive prepayment requirements have not been
LIHPRHA preservation program. Id. See Pub. L. No. 104-204 (FY 97
Appropriations Act); see also H.R.Cong.Rep. No. 812, 104th Cong. (1996).
The preservation program has been redesigned to reduce excessive
costs. . . . To assist the Congress in making a determination of whether
this program is the most cost-effective way to provide affordable
housing opportunities to low-income families, the conferees request the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to evaluate and review the program.
Id., available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
74
HOPE authorized the HUD secretary to limit LIHPRHA funding to
certain developments meeting specified criteria and permitted prepayment so
long as the owners held off on rent increases for sixty days. HOPE § 2(b). The
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act § 219, permanently defunded
LIHPRHA and authorized prepayments notwithstanding its terms. Pub. L. No.
105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 (1998).
Sec. 219. (a) Prepayment Right.—Notwithstanding prior acts:
(1) the owner of the project may prepay, and the mortgagee may accept
prepayment of, the mortgage on the project, and
(2) the owner may request voluntary termination of a mortgage
insurance contract with respect to such project and the contract may be
terminated notwithstanding any requirements under sections 229 and
250 of the National Housing Act.
(b) Conditions.—Any prepayment of a mortgage or termination of an
insurance contract authorized under subsection (a) may be made—
(1) only to the extent that such prepayment or termination is consistent
with the terms and conditions of the mortgage on or mortgage
insurance contract for the project;
(2) only if the owner of the project involved agrees not to increase the
rent charges for any dwelling unit in the project during the 60-day
period beginning upon such prepayment or termination; and
(3) only if the owner of the project provides notice of intent to prepay
or terminate, in such form as the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development may prescribe, to each tenant of the housing, the
Secretary, and the chief executive officer of the appropriate State or
local government for the jurisdiction within which the housing is
located, not less than 150 days, but not more than 270 days, before such
prepayment or termination.
Id.
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applied to any HUD-subsidized mortgage prepayments since 1996,
although Congress has never explicitly repealed LIHPRHA.
As part of its new housing policy, Congress passed the
Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 (HOPE),75
an appropriations bill that limited LIHPRHA funding and shifted
resources to tenant-based subsidy programs, such as Section 8
housing vouchers. Further, Section 219 of HOPE permitted
prepayment of mortgages for subsidized projects without HUD
approval, provided that owners delayed rent increases for at least
sixty days.76 HOPE essentially reinstated most of the owners’
original rights to prepay Section 221(d)(3) and 236 mortgages,
including the right to prepay their mortgages without HUD
approval after twenty years.77
Following the passage of HOPE, a series of congressional
enactments, as part of the Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act, permanently defunded the Preservation Act’s
incentive programs and authorized the prepayment of federally
subsidized mortgages.78 Neither Section 219 nor any other
provision in HOPE or the subsequent Acts contained a preemption
clause such as that in LIHPRHA or references to LIHPRHA’s
express preemption provision.79 Consequently, the interplay
between LIHPRHA’s preemption provision and subsequent federal
housing acts has been the subject of various preservation battles
between low-income tenants and profit-motivated owners. Only
two circuit courts have addressed the relationship between
LIHPRHA and HOPE—the Eighth Circuit in Forest Park II v.
Hadley and the Ninth Circuit in Topa Equities v. City of Los
Angeles. Both courts have found that the LIHPRHA preemption
provision is still applicable law, regardless of the provision under
which an owner purports to be opting out.
75

HOPE § 2(b).
Id. (“[O]nly if the owner of the project involved agrees not to increase
the rent charges for any dwelling unit in the project during the 60-day period
beginning upon such prepayment or termination. . . .”).
77
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act § 219; see also Cienega
Gardens, 38 Fed. Cl. at 70.
78
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act § 219.
79
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732.
76
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Since the 1950s, HUD has subsidized approximately 1.7
million rental units in more than 23,000 privately-owned
properties.80 More than 80,000 low-income apartment units were
preserved through LIHPRHA and the Emergency Act.81 However,
between 1995 and 2003, following the enactment of HOPE and the
return of the twenty-year prepayment option, more than 300,000
units have been removed from the affordable housing stock.82 In
2004, 1.4 million affordable units remained; more than forty
percent of the tenants are elderly.83 Ever-increasing rents in most
urban centers and the trend of owners opting-out of federal housing
programs for larger profits have forced greater involvement by
state and local governments in the provision of decent, affordable
homes to American families.84
80

Hearing on H.R. 4679 Before the House Subcommittee on Housing and
Community Opportunity, House Financial Services Comm., 108th Cong. (2004)
(Testimony of Michael Bodaken, President, National Housing) (July 20, 2004)
[hereinafter
National
Housing
Trust
Testimony],
available
at
http://www.nhtinc.org/documents/072004_NHT_Testimony.pdf.
81
SO. CAL. ASS’N OF GOV’T, THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING PRESERVATION
CRISIS: A RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL HUD-ASSISTED MULTIFAMILY
HOUSING IN THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA REGION (Dec. 2000) [hereinafter RISK
ASSESSMENT STUDY], available at http://api.ucla.edu/workshop/Housing
Preservation/LinksResources/HousingPreservationReportFinal.htm.
82
NAT’L HOUS. TRUST, CHANGES TO PROJECT-BASED MULTIFAMILY UNITS
IN HUD’S INVENTORY BETWEEN 1995 AND 2003 6 (2004), available at
http://www.nhtinc.org/documents/PB_Inventory.pdf.
Analysis of HUD data finds that between 1995 and 2003, the number of
such units dropped from 1.7 million to 1.4 million. The loss of 300,000
affordable rental units is substantially larger than previous estimates.
This loss is especially concerning in light of the shortage of other
available affordable housing for extremely low-income households
across the country.
Id.
83
National Housing Trust Testimony, supra note 80.
84
On average, annual rent increases among American’s major metropolitan
centers were three percent per year from 1988-1997. JACK GOODMAN, NAT’L
MULTI HOUS. COUNCIL, PERFORMANCE ACROSS LOCAL APARTMENT MARKETS
(1999), available at http://www.nmhc.org. See also KALIMA ROSE ET AL., PRATT
INST. CTR. FOR CMTY. & ENV. DEVELOPMENT, INCREASING HOUSING
OPPORTUNITY IN NEW YORK CITY: THE CASE FOR INCLUSIONARY ZONING
(2004) (explaining that the average income for New York renter households
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II. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PRESERVATION POLICIES
Prior to the enactment of the Emergency Act and LIHPRHA,
state and local governments provided limited protections for
federal affordable housing projects. In the wake of LIHPRHA’s
defunding, federal law no longer provides preservation guarantees;
consequently, states and localities have assumed an even larger
role in preserving affordable housing projects.85 Low-income
housing advocates push for increased local government
involvement in preservation because preservation, as compared to
programs hinging on tenant vouchers, prevents the displacement of
residents from their homes and communities, maintains affordable
units for future tenants in need, and provides superior housing
security for tenants and communities.86 In light of recent economic
downturns, preservation also has proved more cost effective for
local governments than the development of new affordable
projects.87 Aggressive state and local preservation policies have
achieved marked success in limiting the conversion of low-income
housing to market-rate units.88 These protections come in a variety
of forms, including procedural requirements for opting out,
limitations on property owners’ returns, and the transfer of
properties to preservation owners.89
grew just three percent from 1975 to 1999, but the average rent went up thirtythree
percent),
available
at
http://www.policylink.org/
Research/NYIZ/default.html.
85
Brian Galle, National Housing Law Project, Preserving Federally
Assisted Housing at the State and Local Level: A Legislative Tool Kit, 29 HOUS.
L. BULL. 183 (1999) (survey of state and local preservation initiatives), available
at http://www.nhlp.org/html/hlb/1099/1099toolkit.htm.
86
Grow, supra note 9, at 5. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 106-161(1999)
(expressing that tenant-based Section 8 vouchers “do not always provide real
rental choice for assisted families” noting that “in a number of cases, families
with vouchers are unable to use their vouchers to obtain affordable housing”),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
87
Grow, supra note 9, at 5.
88
See generally Risk Assessment Study, supra note 81.
89
Galle, supra note 85. Numerous state and localities have also developed
alternative programs aimed primarily at preserving projects through preservation
incentives to current owners. Id. In exchange for new or extended agreements,
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A. Procedural Requirements for Opting Out

Procedural requirements provide information to tenants or local
governments in order to prepare them for the impending removal
of affordability restrictions on subsidized housing projects.90
Current federal law guarantees no less than six months’ notice to
HUD and tenants of an impending market-rate conversion.91 Many
states have statutes requiring that notice be provided to tenants or
local governments in advance of the current 150-day federal notice
period.92
some of these programs provide: refinancing or cash-out current equity; equity
takeout loans for other purposes; partial access to residual receipts or excess
income accounts; and increased dividends. See also National Council of State
Housing Agencies National Preservation Survey (1998), available at
www.nhlp.org/html/pres/state/index.htm (citing programs in California,
Colorado, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin). These state and local incentive-based
preservation programs are beyond the scope of this note and are not likely in
conflict with LIHPRHA preemption. Id.
90
Galle, supra note 85, at 4. Notice requirements may additionally provide
sufficient time for arranging a transfer of the project to a non-profit owner or
deter some owners from prepaying. Id.
91
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act § 219 (requiring any
owner who anticipates a termination of the Section 221(d)(3) or Section 236
mortgage to provide no less than 150 days and no more than 270 days notice to
tenants and to HUD); see also Galle, supra note 85.
92
See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65863.10, et seq. (2001) (requiring, upon any
action that would terminate subsidy for all HUD-subsidized housing, one year’s
notice to tenants, state and local housing authorities, and local governments
prior to termination or prepayment); 1988 Conn. Pub. Acts 88-262 (requiring
one year notice); 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 60/3 (2004) (requiring, upon the
intended sale or disposition of property for all HUD-subsidized housing, six
months’ notice to tenants and to the state housing authority); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4973 (1993) (requiring ninety days notice to state and local
housing authority triggered upon any action that would terminate subsidy for all
HUD-subsidized housing); MD. CODE ANN., art. 83B, § 9-101, et seq. (1989)
(requiring, upon intended sale or disposition of property for all HUD-subsidized
housing, no less than one year or more than two years notice to locality, tenant
association, state – notice is triggered by any action that may terminate subsidy);
MINN. STAT. § 566.17 (1998) (requiring one year notice); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3445-4 et seq. (1988) (providing two years notice to tenant association, state, city;
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For example, a Minnesota statute requires that a landlord who
seeks to opt out of federally subsidized rental housing must
provide tenants with one year’s written notice.93 A second
Minnesota statute requires that, at least twelve months prior to
termination, owners seeking to opt out or prepay their mortgage
loans must submit to the state housing agency, local government,
and affected residents a “tenant impact statement” outlining the
potential impact of the termination on residents.94 These statutes
were the subjects of a challenge by owners in Forest Park II v.
Hadley, a case before the Eighth Circuit.95
Under a similar California law, an owner of an assisted housing
development who seeks to terminate a project-based contract must
and tenant access to information triggered upon sale, conversion, prepayment for
all HUD-subsidized housing); TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 2306.185(f), et seq.
(2005) (requiring one year’s notice to state housing authority triggered upon any
action that would terminate subsidy for all HUD-subsidized housing); WASH.
REV. CODE § 59.28 (2005) (requiring one year notice); DENVER, CO., MUN.
CODE § 12-106, et seq. (2000) (requiring, triggered upon opt out or sale for all
HUD-subsidized housing, one year’s notice to city, tenants for Section 8
contract expirations; 210 days for long-term contract expirations; and 150 days
for one year extensions); Portland, Or., City Code § 30.01.030, et seq. (2005)
(requiring one year notice to city, tenants for § 8 contract expirations; 210 days
for long-term contract expirations; and 150 days for 1 year extensions triggered
upon opt out or sale for all HUD-subsidized housing); SAN FRANCISCO, CA.,
ADMIN. CODE § 60.4, et seq. (1990) (requiring, upon the intended sale or
disposition of property Section 8 contracts, eighteen months’ notice to city and
tenants for prepayment; twelve months’ notice for Section 8 contract
expirations).
93
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.255 (West 2002).
The landlord of federally subsidized rental housing must give
residential tenants of federally subsidized rental housing a one-year
written notice under the following conditions: (1) a federal section 8
contract will expire; (2) the landlord will exercise the option to
terminate or not renew a federal section 8 contract and mortgage; (3)
the landlord will prepay a mortgage and the prepayment will result in
the termination of any federal use restrictions that apply to the housing;
or (4) the landlord will terminate a housing subsidy program.
Id.
94
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.9997 (West 2001). See Forest Park, 336 F.3d at
730.
95
Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2003).
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provide at least nine months’ notice of the proposed change to each
affected tenant household in the assisted housing development.96 In
addition, California law provides that an owner’s notice to tenants
shall simultaneously be filed with a number of public entities,
including the Board of Supervisors of the county, and the

96

Cal. Gov’t. Code § 65863.10(b) mandates that the notices contain
specific information for the purpose of explaining to the tenants the process and
ramifications of the owners’ decision to opt out. Cal. Gov’t. Code §
65863.10(b). Cal Gov’t Code § 65863.10 provides:
(b) At least nine months prior to the anticipated date of termination of a
subsidy contract or prepayment on an assisted housing development,
the owner proposing the termination or prepayment of governmental
assistance shall provide a notice of the proposed change to each
affected tenant household residing in the assisted housing development
at the time the notice is provided.
Id. § 65863.10. The amended Cal. Gov’t Code § 65863.10(b)(1) requires twelve
months notice. Cal. Gov’t. Code § 65863.10(b)(1)-(6) provides:
(1) The anticipated date of the termination or prepayment of the federal
program, and the identity of the federal program . . . .
(2) The current rent and anticipated new rent for the unit on the date of
the prepayment or termination of the federal program . . . .
(3) A statement that a copy of the notice will be sent to the city or
county, or city and county, where the assisted development is located,
to the appropriate local public housing authority, if any, and to the
Department of Housing and Community Redevelopment.
(4) A statement of the possibility that the housing may remain in the
federal program after the proposed date of subsidy termination or
prepayment if the owner elects to do so.
(5) A statement of the owners’ intention to participate in any current
replacement federal subsidy program made available to affected
tenants.
(6) The name and telephone number of the city, county, or city and
county, the appropriate local public housing authority, if any, the
Department of Housing and Community Development, and a legal
services organization, that can be contacted to request additional
written information about an owner’s responsibilities and the rights and
options of an affected tenant.
Id. § 65863.10(b)(1)-(6).
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Department of Housing and Community Development.97
B. Limiting Property Owners’ Returns
The primary purpose of market-rate conversion is to increase
an owner’s rents and profits. With this in mind, states and localities
have also attempted to prevent owners from opting out through
regulations that increase the costs of conversion.98 Governments
have achieved this through either direct regulation of rent levels
(i.e., rent control) or other requirements, such as so-called
“statutory leases” or prepayment fees.99
The Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (LARSO),100
for example, prohibits owners of buildings previously subsidized
by HUD from moving their rents to market level.101 LARSO
97

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65063.10(c)(1). These entities shall send additional
notices containing supplemental information regarding the number of tenants
affected, the number of units that are government assisted and the types of
assistance they receive, the number of the units that are not government assisted,
the number of bedrooms in each unit that is government assisted, and the ages
and income of the affected tenants. Id. § 65863.10(c)(2).
98
Galle, supra note 85, at 2.
99
Id. at 3 (“Typically, [rent control] in the area involves setting the ‘base
rent’ for any property exiting the federal subsidy or assistance program at the
last rent level in effect under that program and then subsequently applying the
generally applicable rent regulations on general and individual rent
adjustments.”). See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CA. CODE § 37 (1998); LOS
ANGELES, CA MUNICIPAL CODE § 151.02 (1995). Massachusetts has a similar
statute that applies to all projects that terminated their government
“involvement” in either insurance, interest subsidies, or rental assistance. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 14 (2001).
States and localities have enacted legislation imposing tenant relocation
costs on owners who convert their affordable housing project to market-rate. See
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-45-11 (imposing moving costs); MD. ANN. CODE ART.
83B § 9-105(a) (imposing moving costs up to $975); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.28
(imposing relocation payment level of $2,000, half payable by the owner and
half payable by the city). Seattle enacted a local relocation ordinance that
applies to any displacement caused by demolition, change of use, substantial
rehabilitation, or removal of use restrictions on federally assisted housing
developments. SEATTLE, WA MUNICIPAL CODE §22.210 (enacted 1990).
100
LOS ANGELES MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 151.01-04. (1995).
101
Id. See also Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1067. This includes buildings
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requires that, instead of entering the open market, properties
exiting federal subsidy or assistance programs must enter the rent
stabilization program at the rent previously charged when the
buildings were under federal rent restrictions.102 The ordinance
also provides that rents may not be adjusted “if a rental unit is
vacated as a result of the termination of the regulation of the rental
unit under any local, state, or federal program,” requiring the unit
to remain available to low-income tenants even though vacancy
decontrol would normally free the unit.103 This regulation was the
subject of a challenge by owners in Topa Equities v. City of Los
Angeles.104
Another alternative involves so-called “statutory leases,”
through which tenants in converted buildings receive mandatory
temporary lease renewals under terms “specified by law at rent
levels roughly equal to those in effect under the federal program”
prior to conversion.105 Both Rhode Island and Maryland have
statutes that employ this concept.106
C. Transfer of Properties to Preservation Owners
Recently, several states introduced and passed laws designed to
permanently preserve at-risk properties by transferring ownership
of the buildings to non-speculative or not-for-profit owners.107
that participated under Section 221(d)(3) and 236 programs. Id.
102
Originally LARSO was Los Angeles’s general rent control regulation
and applied only to standard, “free-market” rental units. Topa Equities, 342 F.3d
at 1067. In 1990, Los Angeles amended LARSO to apply to properties that
participate in federal programs under the NHA. Id. LARSO also contains a
vacancy decontrol provision that permits owners to raise the rent for a unit to
market level after the tenancy for that unit has terminated. Id.
103
Id.
104
342 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003).
105
Galle, supra note 85, at 3.
106
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-45-11; MD. ANN. CODE ART 83B §§ 9-101–9-114;
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.30-A § 4976.
107
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65863.10, et seq. (2001) (providing an offer to
purchase to tenant associations, non-profit organizations, some for-profit
organizations, and public agencies upon any action that would terminate the
subsidy regarding all HUD-subsidized housing); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 3805/8.1
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Many affordable housing advocates argue that such transfers are
the best way to preserve at-risk housing because they are more
likely to keep tenants in their homes and preserve properties as
future housing sources.108 Generally, these laws provide non(2004) (providing the tenant association with a true right of first refusal for all
HUD-subsidized housing that is triggered upon the intended sale or disposition
of property); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4973 (1993) (providing the state
housing authority with a true right of first refusal that is triggered upon any
action that would terminate the subsidy for all HUD-subsidized housing); MD.
CODE ANN., art. 83B, § 9-101, et seq. (1989) (providing the local housing
authority, groups representing tenants, and non-profit organizations with a true
right of first refusal that is triggered upon the intended sale or disposition of
property for all HUD-subsidized housing); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-45-4 et seq.
(1988) (providing the tenant association, state housing authority, local housing
authority, and locality with a true right of first refusal that is triggered for all
HUD-subsidized housing upon sale, conversion, prepayment); TEX. GOV’T.
CODE ANN. § 2306.185(f), et seq. (2005) (providing time for the state to locate a
potential buyer, triggered upon any action that would terminate the subsidy for
all HUD-subsidized housing); DENVER, CO., MUN. CODE § 12-106, et seq.
(2000) (providing time for the city to negotiate for purchase, triggered upon opt
out or sale for all HUD-subsidized housing); PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE §
30.01.030, et seq. (2005) (providing time for the city to negotiate for purchase,
triggered upon opt-out or sale for all HUD-subsidized housing); SAN
FRANCISCO, CA., ADMIN. CODE § 60.4, et seq. (1990) (providing the city, tenant
association, and non-profit organizations with a true right of first refusal
triggered upon the intended sale or disposition of Section 8 properties).
108
Galle, supra note 85, at 6.
If cost were no object, permanent preservation of at-risk properties via
transfer to non-speculative ownership would probably be the best way
to preserve at-risk housing. Moving projects into the hands of entities
whose purpose is providing housing rather than generating profit—such
as tenant-endorsed or controlled non-profits— is more likely to keep
tenants in their homes and preserve the property as a future housing
resource. Obtaining both the necessary funds for transfer and site
control from private owners remain difficult challenges in the everchanging policy and budget picture. In addition, local government
activities that enable nonprofit purchasers to be competitive with other
options available to owners interested in converting to market-rate use
(e.g., identifying potential conversion candidates, contacting owners to
explore transfer options, providing predevelopment support for
purchasers) will continue to be especially important in preserving units.
Id.
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speculative or not-for-profit entities either a true “right of first
refusal,” which permits a designated purchaser to match another
sale offer and thereby acquire title, or a “right to make an offer,”
with or without an obligation on the owner’s part to sell.109
A California law requires that owners of affordable housing
projects must, at least twelve months prior to prepayment, offer the
property for sale to everyone on a state-maintained list of
prospective purchasers who have indicated their willingness to
assure the long-term affordability of the housing.110 For 180 days,
these prospective purchasers have an exclusive right to make an
offer. For an additional 180 days thereafter, all prospective buyers
who made offers but were rejected still maintain a right of first
refusal. This regulation was the subject of a challenge by owners in
the Eastern District of California in Kenneth Arms v. Martinez,111
which upheld the law in the face of a preemption challenge. The
federal circuit courts have yet to rule on the validity of these laws
109

See, e.g., National Housing Law Program, Right of First Refusal in
Preservation Properties: Worth a Second Look, 32 HOUS. L. BULL. 1 (Jan.
2002); National Housing Law Program, Illinois Establishes Tenant Purchase
Option for Properties Terminating Federal Programs, 34 HOUS. L. BULL. 150
(July 2004) (discussing the Illinois law that provides an opportunity to purchase
the property and preserve it as low-income housing before an owner converts it
to market rent). In combination with mechanisms to obtain site control, some
localities have adopted formula(s) specifying the sale price of preservation
properties. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4973 (creating
“preemptive options,” triggered by the act of prepayment or opt-out, that
combine notice requirements with a right of first refusal for the state housing
agency whenever the owner takes an action that would terminate a project’s
subsidies); SAN FRANCISCO, CA ADMIN. CODE § 60.7(a) (setting a “Fair Return
Price” based upon certain appraisal assumptions that the owner must accept as a
sale price).
110
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65863.11 (2001). Under Cal. Gov’t Code §
65863.11(b)-(c), an owner may not sell or otherwise dispose of his development
in a manner that would result in either discontinuance of the development’s
status as an assisted housing development or the termination of any low-income
use restrictions that apply to the development, unless the owner provides an
opportunity to purchase the developments to specified public and private
entities. Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *33 (citing CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 65863.11(b)-(c) (amended 2001)).
111
Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *36.
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in light of Section 4122 of LIHPRHA. Discussions regarding the
effect of federal preemption on these regulations frequently arise,
however, in state and city legislatures at hearings and debates
about preservation policies.112
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR PREEMPTION
Preemption is the power of the federal government to supplant
state law with respect to matters the federal government has the
power to regulate under the U.S. Constitution.113 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that congressional intent determines
when a congressional act preempts state or local law.114
Preemption of a state law by federal law may be either explicitly
stated in the language of a federal statute, such as the LIHPRHA
preemption provision, or read by the courts to be implicitly
contained in the statute’s structure or purpose; that is, preemption
may be express or implied.115 If a federal law expressly or
112

Grow, supra note 9, at 2; see also Galle, supra note 85, at 2; Chen,
supra note 10.
113
Preemption power is generally viewed as arising from the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Stabile, infra note 115, at 2, n.2; see, e.g.,
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (noting “that state
law conflicting with federal law is without effect”).
114
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96
1992 (“The question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law
is one of congressional intent. The purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone. To discern Congress’s intent we examine the explicit statutory
language and the structure and purpose of the statute.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
115
Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for
Congress of the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1995); see also Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-54 (1982) (explaining how federal regulatory or
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impliedly preempts a state law, then “the state law may not be used
by a plaintiff to impose liability on a defendant.”116 There is a legal
presumption against the preemption of state or local housing laws;
however, Congress may preempt both explicitly.117
Express preemption “occurs when a statute contains an explicit
statement addressing the preemptive effect of the statute on state
law claims, rather than leaving it to the courts to decide, in any
given dispute, whether the federal statute preempts state law.”118
Courts are usually called upon to interpret the precise scope of an
express preemption provision, the application of which is clear, as
Congress added the provision to the statute.119 Forest Park, Topa
Equities, and their progeny are distinct in requiring the court to
apply LIHPRHA’s preemption provision to HOPE, a distinct
statutory program. The standard express preemption inquiry does
not require this additional step because a preemption provision is
generally part of the statute at issue.120
In the absence of an express preemption provision, preemption
may be implied.121 This implication may arise from a pervasive
scheme of federal regulation, in which case federal law is said to
“occupy the field.”122 Alternatively, implied preemption may arise
statutory law may expressly or impliedly preempt state law).
116
Stabile, supra note 115, at 3.
117
For discussion on the presumption against federal preemption of local
police powers, see infra note 133 through 136 and accompanying text.
118
Stabile, supra note 115, at 2.
119
Id.
120
See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 1144(a),
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter ERISA]
(preempting all state laws that relate to employee benefit plans covered by
ERISA); Hazardous Material Transportation Act, 29 U.S.C. app. 1811(a)
(1988).
121
Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2003); Topa
Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).
122
See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)
(concluding that the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act “occup[y] the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory
program supervised by an expert administrative agency”); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), rev’d sub nom. Rice v. Board of
Trade of Chicago, 331 U.S. 247 (1947) (stating that federal regulatory scheme
may be so pervasive or federal interest so dominant that enforcement of state
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from a conflict between state law and federal law.123 Such a
conflict can be actual, such as where it is impossible to satisfy both
federal and state law simultaneously, or indirect, when a state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s
objectives.124
In both express and implied preemption contexts, congressional
intent is “the ultimate touchstone” in determining the extent of
federal preemption.125 Thus, in determining whether preemption is
expressly addressed in a statute, “courts ask the question: did
Congress intend its law to preempt a challenged state law?”126
Since courts generally prefer to give effect to the plain and
ordinary reading of statutory language, in express preemption
situations, congressional intent is sought primarily in the language
of the preemption provision.127 That is, where a statute contains an
laws on same subject is precluded).
123
See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 153. Preemption of
state law where an actual conflict exists between a federal enactment and state
law is compelled by the Supremacy Clause. For further discussion of the
Supremacy Clause, see supra note 113.
124
See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (noting that state law is preempted where it
is physically impossible to comply with both federal and state law); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1961) (“A
holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry
into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .”).
125
Stabile, supra note 115, at 7 (citing Gade, 505 U.S. at 96).
126
Id.
127
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. In using the plain meaning approach, it is
assumed that the legislature probably used the words, grammar, and punctuation
in a normal way to communicate its intent, so the words, grammar, and
punctuation are to be given the meaning that they would ordinarily produce
when trying to determine the legislature’s intent. The plain meaning statutory
analysis begins with “the assumption that the ordinary meaning of [the]
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v.
Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). The plain meaning rule
instructs a court to give the words of a statutory provision their “natural
meaning,” unless doing so “would lead to a clearly unreasonable, absurd
interpretation or there is otherwise clear evidence that Congress intended
something other than the plain meaning of the statute.” Stabile, supra note 115,
at 3, n.12 (citing Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758-62 (1992) (noting that

FREEDMAN MACROED CORRECTED 5-31-05.DOC

772

6/6/2005 1:26 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

express preemption provision, the issue of whether a state law is
preempted is viewed as a question of statutory interpretation.128
Prior to 1992, many courts engaged in implied preemption
analysis after finding that a preemption provision did not invalidate
state law.129 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,130 a case
examining the preemptive scope of the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, the Supreme Court stated that there is no
need to examine further the substantive provisions of legislation to
infer congressional intent to preempt state law when Congress has
included in the legislation a provision explicitly addressing
preemption and when that provision provides a “reliable indicium

the opponent of the plain meaning bears an exceptionally heavy burden of
persuasion in proving that Congress intended an alternative reading); Garcia v.
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (stating that only an extraordinary
showing of contrary intentions from the statute’s legislative history would
justify a limitation on the unambiguous plain meaning of the statute’s language);
see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (explaining that if
the language in question has a plain and unambiguous meaning, then the court
should not inquire further except in rare and exceptional cases).
The Supreme Court has used the plain meaning approach in interpreting
various preemption provisions. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97
(1983) (“A law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”) (citing BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979)); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374, 383 (1988) (analogously applying Black’s Law Dictionary
“relates to” definition to the interpretation of ADA); Cippolone, 505 U.S. at
520-24 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97) (finding that the plain meaning of “no
requirement or prohibition” sweeps broadly enough to encompass common-law
obligations; thus the Court must give effect to the plain meaning unless there is
clear congressional intent otherwise).
128
Stabile, supra note 115, at 7.
129
Id. at 57 n.209 (citing Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816,
825-27 (11th Cir. 1989)) (holding that a common law tort action for failure to
install airbags was not expressly preempted by the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, but was impliedly preempted by the provisions of Act), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 42021 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that claims were impliedly preempted by the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, but not expressly preempted)).
130
505 U.S. 504 (1992). For a discussion on Cipollone, see Stabile, supra
note 115, at 59.
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of congressional intent with respect to state authority.”131 The
Court reasoned that Congress’s enactment of an express
preemption provision implies that matters beyond the reach of that
provision are not preempted.132
There is a presumption against federal preemption of laws
concerning “spheres traditionally occupied by the states.”133
Housing regulations, land use restrictions, and zoning ordinances
are within the traditional spheres of state and local police
powers.134 Historically, preemption of a state or local law is not
131

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
Id.
133
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (“States traditionally
have had great latitude under the police powers to legislate as to the protection
of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.”); N.Y. State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 655 (1995) (citing and quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230) (noting that the
exercise by a local authority of its historic police power is not to be superseded
by federal statutes unless this was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982)
(explaining that preemption is not appropriate in areas in which states
traditionally have enjoyed broad power to regulate).
134
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (noting that
property is bought and sold and investments are made subject to the State’s
power to regulate); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (holding that
the Takings Clause, while conferring substantial protection on property owners,
does not eliminate the police power of the State to enact limitations on the use of
their property); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987).
The government’s power to forbid particular land uses in order to
advance some legitimate police-power purpose includes the power to
condition such use upon some concession by the owner, even a
concession of property rights, so long as the condition furthers the same
governmental purpose advanced as justification for prohibiting the use.
Id. See also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340,
361 (1986).
[P]olice power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other landuse restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order
to promote the public good just as effectively as formal condemnation
or physical invasion of property. From the property owner’s point of
view, it may matter little whether his land is condemned or flooded, or
whether it is restricted by regulation to use in its natural state, if the
effect in both cases is to deprive him of all beneficial use of it.
132
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lightly presumed, and courts exercise great restraint when spheres
traditionally occupied by the states are the subjects of a preemption
challenge.135 Therefore, even with express preemption, it is
difficult to argue that a federal law was intended to broadly
supplant the power of state or local governments with regard to
housing or land use issues.136
IV. FOREST PARK AND TOPA EQUITIES
In Forest Park137 and Topa Equities,138 the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits, respectively, held that the LIHPRHA preemption
provision applies to housing projects opting out of federal
programs under HOPE.139 The courts reached opposite conclusions
regarding federal preemption of the state preservation laws at issue
because of the diverging preemption tests each court embraced.140
Id. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954) (noting that land use regulation is within the inherent police
powers of the States and their political subdivisions).
135
For a discussion on the presumption against preemption, see supra note
133. See also Chester v. Panicucci, 281 A.2d 811 (1971) (explaining that federal
preemption of local police powers must be explicit).
136
See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 860 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citing U.S. v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)). Principles of
federalism dictate that in the absence of a clear intent to supersede the historic
police powers of the States, Congress cannot be deemed to have significantly
changed the federal-state balance. Franklin Tower, 157 N.J. at 615; see also N.Y.
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 514 U.S. at 654. Because
the party claiming preemption bears the heavy burden of supporting that claim
by “clear and manifest evidence,” the starting point for any preemption analysis
dealing with housing issues is that Congress does not generally intend to
supplant state law. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans,
514 U.S. at 654.
137
Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2003).
138
Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.
2003).
139
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732.
140
Compare Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732 (holding that the Minnesota
preservation statutes at issue are expressly and impliedly preempted by the
applicable federal statutes) with Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070 (holding that
the Los Angeles preservation ordinance at issue is not expressly or impliedly
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In Topa Equities, the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish the
Eighth Circuit’s holding in Forest Park on the grounds that the
preservation laws were fundamentally different.141 However, at
least one federal court has observed that the Ninth Circuit’s
holding concerning the applicable scope of the LIHPRHA
preemption provision conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s practical
effects test.142
A. Applying the Preservation Act’s Preemption Provision to
HOPE’s Alternative Prepayment Schedule: The Plain
Reading
In Forest Park II v. Hadley, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a
tenant’s association’s attempt to delay the prepayment of a Section
236 mortgage by the owner of a low-income housing
development.143 The Minnesota statutes at issue require that an
owner provide one year’s notice in advance of prepayment, while
current federal law under HOPE requires notice of no less than 150
days.144 The owner complied with federal requirements, but failed
to comply with the state notice requirement.145 The district court
found that since the building owner was opting out of the federal
affordable housing program under HOPE’s prepayment provisions,
LIHPRHA did not apply.146 The district court granted the tenant’s
preempted by the applicable federal statutes). Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069;
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 724.
141
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069.
142
Independence Park Apts. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 692, 704 (Fed. Cl.
2004).
143
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 727.
144
Id. at 729-30.
145
Id. at 727.
146
Forest Park II v. Hadley, 203 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1077-78 (D. Minn.
2002).
As indicated by the language of Section 4122, the statute only preempts
state law that is “inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter”; in
other words LIHPRHA. 12 U.S.C. § 4122(b) (2005). Section 4122
therefore has no applicability to state laws that may conflict with the
notice provisions enacted apart from LIHPRHA. In this case, Forest
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association injunctive relief until the owner complied with both
state and federal law.147
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit observed that, “unlike cases
involving a field traditionally regulated by the states, there [was]
no presumption against preemption in this case” because the case
did not involve a field traditionally regulated by the states.148 The
court determined that the central issue was not whether the statutes
involved a field subject to the state’s traditional police power, but
rather, whether Minnesota law was restricting HUD from
administering the “entity it regulates”—the HUD-subsidized
project.149 The court rejected traditional preemption analysis, in
which congressional intent controls, because, under the Supremacy
Clause,150 “state statutes may not interfere with the implementation
of a federal program by a federal agency.”151 Therefore, the court
regarded congressional intent and legislative history as irrelevant
because in the regulatory realm at issue, federal law reigned
supreme.152 The court effectively short-circuited the preemption
analysis by determining that the issue was settled by the state
statute’s frustration of a federal administrative agency’s acts.
Unlike the district court below, the Eighth Circuit was not
Park II asserts that the relevant state laws conflict with Section 219 of
the 1999 HUD Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 105-276, §
219(b)(3)(1999).
Id. at 1075.
147
Id.
148
Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724, 731 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001)) (“The
relationship between a federal agency and the entity it regulates is inherently
federal in character because the relationship originates from, is governed by, and
terminates according to federal law.”).
149
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 731-32.
150
See Supremacy Clause, supra note 113.
151
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 731-32 (citing Gade, 505 U.S. at 96) (noting
that in traditional preemption analysis, the “ultimate touchstone” is
congressional intent, but that the unique federal laws and programs involved in
the case make it difficult to apply a traditional preemption analysis). The court
also noted that there was no presumption against preemption in this case. Id.
(citing Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347).
152
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 732.
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persuaded by the tenants’ argument that LIHPRHA was implicitly
repealed because Congress ceased funding its incentive programs.
The circuit court found that LIHPRHA had not been explicitly
repealed, and it was still applicable because the loans at issue were
described in the eligibility provision.153 The LIHPRHA preemption
provision, according to the court, therefore remains enforceable
against state or local laws that “restrict or inhibit” prepayment.154
Under this rationale, federal law, not state law, provides the
appropriate notice requirements.
The Ninth Circuit heard similar arguments in the case of Topa
Equities v. City of Los Angeles,155 in which an owner of an
apartment building challenged a Los Angeles ordinance
prohibiting owners of low-income housing who had previously
opted-out of federal housing programs from raising rents until
existing low-income tenancies had terminated.156 The building
owner had prepaid his Section 236 mortgage in hopes of raising
rents to market levels and claimed that Section 4122 preempted the
city ordinance.157 The city argued, and the district court agreed,
that HOPE impliedly repealed the LIHPRHA preemption clause,
given that the Act’s new opt-out requirements post-dated the
defunding of LIHPRHA.158
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and
concurred with the Eighth Circuit’s holding that LIHPRHA’s
153

Id. at 733.
Congress used very broad language in defining the types of mortgages
covered by the preemption provision. To the extent that it intended
preemption to apply only to laws affecting mortgages subject to
LIHPRHA, it could have stated as much. The fact that Congress no
longer funds the incentive programs established by LIHPRHA does not
mean that the prepayment provisions contained therein are irrelevant or
that the statute is no longer the law.
Id.
154
155

Id.
Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.

2003).
156
157
158

Id. at 1070.
Id.
Id.
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preemption provision applies to HOPE’s prepayment schedule.159
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit determined that LIHPRHA’s
preemption provision was still effective, despite the termination of
funding for LIHPRHA-based programs.160 The court concluded
that congressional inaction had no effect on LIHPRHA’s express
preemption provision.161 Thus, the court expressly joined the
Eighth Circuit in limiting the inquiry to the unrepealed language of
the dormant LIHPRHA program.162
B. Determining the Scope of the Preservation Act’s Preemption
Provision
In Forest Park, the Eighth Circuit determined that Congress
intended for Section 4122 to be applied broadly.163 The court
supported its holding by citing the broadness of the “restrict or
inhibit” language of LIHPRHA’s preemption provision. Further,
the court emphasized that Congress had originally intended to offer
prepayment as an incentive for owners to participate in the HUD
program.164 According to the court, the broad language used in
defining the types of mortgages covered by the preemption
provision implied that the provision’s application was not limited
to mortgages subject to a POA for LIHPRHA prepayment.165 The
court therefore interpreted the Preservation Act’s preemption
provision to apply to projects opting out under alternative

159

Id.
Id. at 1069 (citing and quoting Firebaugh Canal Co. v. United States,
203 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000)) (“The intention of the legislature to repeal
must be clear and manifest, and in the absence of some affirmative showing of
an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by
implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.”).
161
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069 (“While it is true that Congress has,
since enacting HOPE, ceased funding LIHPRHA’s incentive programs, that
inaction has no effect on LIHPRHA’s express preemption provision. That
provision is extant.”).
162
Id.
163
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 732-34.
164
Id.
165
Id.
160
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prepayment processes, such as HOPE.166
In order to determine whether the Minnesota statutes “restrict
or inhibit” the prepayment of mortgages, the court examined the
“practical effect” of the state restrictions.167 The court recognized
that the statutes did not, on their face, directly “restrict or inhibit”
the prepayment of mortgages.168 Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the effect of the state statutes was to “restrict or
inhibit” prepayment of federal mortgages since an owner could be
in compliance with the federal notice requirement when prepaying
the mortgage, but would still need to wait to prepay in order to
comply with the state’s notice requirements.169 The court explained
that because compliance with state regulations is required, “the
statutes have the direct effect of impeding, burdening, and
inhibiting the prepayment of federal mortgages even if the
additional requirements may be minimal.”170
Moreover, the court found that the federal laws regarding
prepayment “impliedly preempt the [Minnesota] statutes because
the state statutes conflict with federal law.”171 Under the practical
effects test, any statute that diminishes the realization of federally

166

Id. at 729.
Id. at 733.
168
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 733.
169
Id. The court stated:
The effect is that the state law forces the federal government to
continue to provide financial assistance to the participant when both the
federal government and the participant have chosen to end their
relationship. In this way, the state law not only regulates the conduct of
the citizen-owner, requiring him to take additional actions in order to
withdraw, but also regulates or restricts the actions of the federal
government under its own federal program.
167

Id.
170

Id. The court described the state statute as an additional requirement
“that forces owners to remain in a federally subsidized program from which
Congress has authorized withdrawal.” Id. at 733-34. The court further explained
that “[s]ince the Minnesota law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of [HUD’s] full purposes and objectives as defined by Congress, it
must give way.” Id.
171
Id. at 733.
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granted expectations is preempted by Section 4122.172
The Ninth Circuit in Topa Equities v. City of Los Angeles173
determined that the preemption provision should be narrowly
applied, thereby implicitly rejecting the “practical effects”
approach endorsed by the Eighth Circuit.174 The Ninth Circuit
articulated a different test—the “legal consequences” approach—
for determining whether the state statute at issue was preempted by
LIHPRHA.175
Under the legal consequences test, the court found that the Los
Angeles rent stabilization law was not preempted as applied to a
building opting out of a Section 236 HUD-subsidized mortgage.176
The Ninth Circuit examined whether LARSO directly prohibited or
limited the ability of federal housing project owners to prepay their
mortgages by imposing some legal bar or impediment to their
doing so. Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Forest Park, the Topa
Equities court did not address whether LARSO made prepayment
impracticable as an economic matter.177
In reviewing the case, the court noted that there was a
presumption against preemption stemming from the historical
understanding of housing and land use issues as part of the states’
police powers.178 The court cited paragraph (b) of the LIHPRHA
172
173

Id.
Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.

2003).
174

Id.
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1071 (quoting from Kargman v. Sullivan,
552 F.2d 2, 6 (1st Cir. 1977)). The court in Kargman addressed whether a local
rent control ordinance was preempted by HUD regulations. The First Circuit
concluded that the ordinance was not preempted because it operated
independently from the federal subsidized housing program. Kargman, 552 F.2d
at 6. A different result was reached by the First Circuit in City of Boston v.
Harris, 619 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1980), in which the Court of Appeals held that
Boston’s rent control ordinance directly conflicted with HUD regulations and
was accordingly preempted. The Court in Topa Equities looked to whether the
city’s “traditionally strong interest in local rent control must yield.” Topa
Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070.
175
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preemption provision, which preserves certain state or local laws,
and commented that “nothing in the HUD regulations purports to
limit states from enacting their own rent control laws of general
applicability which apply equally to apartment owners who exit the
federal program as well as other apartment owners.”179
Additionally, the court cited a First Circuit decision that held that
“federal legislation creating the network of subsidized housing
laws is superimposed upon and consciously interdependent from
the substructure of local law relating to housing.”180
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the local ordinance at issue
was not preempted by Section 4122 because it did not “restrict or
prohibit” an owner’s prepayment options.181 Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit held that subsection (b) of Section 4122 insulated the city
ordinance from challenge because the ordinance applied across the
board, preventing all owners of low-income housing from
increasing rents, regardless of whether an had owner prepaid or
opted out of federal housing programs.182 The court distinguished
the Eighth Circuit’s findings in Forest Park by holding that the
Los Angeles ordinance, unlike the Minnesota statutes, restricted
rental increases in all apartment buildings, regardless of an owner’s
past or present participation in federal housing programs.183
The Eighth Circuit in Forest Park184 and Ninth Circuit in Topa

179

Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1072.
Id. (citing to Kargman, 552 F.2d at 1).
181
Id. at 1067.
182
Id. at 1070.
183
Id. (finding that the Minnesota law prohibited prepayment of federal
programs if the participant did not provide a longer period of notice than the
federal notice required upon opting out of the federal program; therefore, while
the Los Angeles ordinance affected all low-income housing owners, regardless
of participation in federal low-income housing programs, the Minnesota statute
was specifically limited to those owners who sought to prepay federalsubsidized mortgages) (citing Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470)
(finding state statutes that required owners seeking to prepay federally
subsidized mortgages to comply with state regulations that required longer
notice than federal law and provided tenants with first refusal rights were not
preempted by the preemption language contained in LIHPRHA).
184
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 724.
180
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Equities185 are the only circuit courts to have ruled on whether the
LIHPRHA preemption provision applies to housing projects opting
out under alternative federal statutes.186 The courts’ decisions to
apply the preemption provision in such cases were based on a plain
and ordinary reading of the statute. While the cases are
distinguishable based on the types of statutes or regulations
involved (a procedural requirement to opting out as compared to a
regulation limiting property owners’ returns upon opting out), they
appear to conflict regarding the applicable scope of LIHPRHA’s
preemption provision.187
V. ANALYSIS
The holdings of Forest Park188 and Topa Equities189 have
significant implications for the low- and very-low income tenants
residing in the remaining 1.4 million rental units in more than
23,000 privately owned, HUD-subsidized properties.190 These
holdings restrict the ability of state and local governments to
address distinctly local housing issues in the face of the federal
government’s progressive burdening of state and local
governments with responsibility for administering federal
programs to house the poor.191 In their attempts to address
affordable housing shortages, several states and localities have
enacted preservation laws that work to maintain the quickly
diminishing permanent stock of affordable housing.192 Despite the
185

Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1065.
Id. at 1069; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732.
187
Independence Park Apts. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 692, 704 (Fed.
Cl., 2004). Compare Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732 (holding that the Minnesota
preservation statutes are expressly and impliedly preempted by the applicable
federal statutes) with Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070 (holding that the Los
Angeles preservation ordinance is not expressly or impliedly preempted by the
applicable federal statutes).
188
Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2003).
189
Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.
2003).
190
National Housing Trust Testimony, supra note 80.
191
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069; Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 724.
192
For discussion on state and local preservation policies, see supra Part
186
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agreement of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits regarding the first issue
in the preemption analysis—whether LIHPRHA’s preemption
provision applies to HOPE’s prepayment provisions—courts
should continue to review this issue, particularly in light of the
ambiguous and incongruous results of the Eighth and Ninth
Circuit’s plain reading interpretation of an implied relationship
between LIHPRHA and HOPE.
With regard to the circuit split on the second issue—the
applicable scope of federal preemption—the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning is more consistent with past preemption jurisprudence.
First, housing regulations, land use restrictions, and zoning
ordinances are within the zone of state police powers.193 In light of
the presumption against preemption of laws and regulations
enacted in accordance with a state’s police powers, the provision
must be construed narrowly.194 Second, LIHPRHA’s legislative
history illustrates congressional intent not to limit the ability of
state and local governments to regulate privately owned,
subsidized affordable housing projects after opt out.195 The courts’
interpretations of these issues determine whether owners are
permitted to opt out without complying with the state procedures
intended to preserve affordable housing.
A. In Search of Congressional Intent
Although the Eighth and Ninth Circuits ruled on the issue of
whether the LIHPRHA preemption provision applies to projects
opting out of federal affordability restrictions under HOPE, this
remains an open question. State courts and federal courts in other
circuits are not bound by the decisions of these circuits; indeed, a
state court in the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion
subsequent to Ninth Circuit’s decision in Topa Equities.196 The
III.
193

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
Cipollone v. Liggett Groups, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
195
See infra notes 256 through 260 and accompanying text.
196
College Gardens Preservation Committee v. Eugene Burger, No. 03
AS02608, slip op., at 3 (Sac. Superior Court, Cal. Nov. 19, 2003) (ruling that
California’s law requiring notice to tenants in prepaying rental projects was not
194
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debate over whether to apply the LIHPRHA preemption provision
to HOPE is shaped by differing methods of statutory interpretation:
the circuit courts have applied a plain meaning approach, while
affordable housing advocates have sought to direct the courts’
attention to the statutory purpose and congressional history of
LIHPRHA.197 The standard for determining the effect of the
LIHPRHA preemption provision is congressional intent; therefore,
the method of statutory interpretation applied by the courts dictates
the scope of the examination.198
The plain meaning approach used by the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits gives effect to the clear, ordinary language of the Acts.199
The LIHPRHA preemption provision, by its terms, applies to any
laws or regulations that restrict prepayments of “eligible lowincome housing.”200 In 1990, when Congress enacted LIHPRHA,
buildings in all federal housing programs were LIHPRHA eligible
and regulated by HUD.201 The Eighth Circuit determined that
preempted by the long-dormant LIHPRHA when the owners were not seeking to
prepay under LIHPRHA), available at http://www.ruralhome.org/manager/
uploads/college.pdf.
197
Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 729 (“Appellees argue that [the preemption]
provision is not applicable to Forest Park’s Section 236 mortgage because of
Congress’s subsequent actions.”); see generally Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at
1070.
198
Ultimately, rules of statutory interpretation attempt to determine the
“intent of the legislature.” 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.5
(6th ed.). Differing theories of statutory interpretation are in essence means of
giving a particular law the meaning intended by Congress. For a discussion on
the plain meaning method of statutory interpretation, see supra note 127.
199
Id.
200
H.R. Rep. No. 101-559, at 78 (1990) [hereinafter House Comm. Report].
[Section] 4122 would preempt and declare null and void any state or
local law, ordinance or regulation that limits an owner’s right to pay off
a mortgage on eligible low- income housing or, limits the occupancy,
type of tenure, use or rental charges of such a property. The committee
wishes to emphasize that the pre-emption provision only applies to
eligible housing, defined in the bill as projects with mortgages that are
insured or assigned under Section 221 (d)(3)(BMIR) or Section 236
program.
Id. (emphasis added).
201
Id.
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Minnesota laws mandating additional procedural requirements for
projects attempting to opt out of federal affordable housing
programs infringed upon HUD’s administrative mandate to
regulate federal housing policies and programs.202 The court
concluded that legislative history was irrelevant because the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the states
from interfering with the implementation of a federal program by a
federal agency.203 The court therefore held that the Minnesota laws
were preempted based on a plain reading of HUD’s federal
prerogatives and the state law’s impact on housing under federal
programs.
Through its cursory analysis, the Eighth Circuit bypassed the
opportunity to examine other evidence of congressional intent,
including relevant legislative history and HUD’s own policies,
which do not support the application of the LIHPRHA preemption
provision to projects opting out through HOPE.204 The Ninth
Circuit expressly adopted the Eighth Circuit’s holding without
significant discussion. The court appeared content with the plain
reading conclusion that because LIHPRHA had not been explicitly
repealed, the preemption provision continued to apply to HUDregulated housing projects and programs.
The circuit courts’ plain meaning interpretation of LIHPRHA
leads to ambiguous and incongruous results. As such, the circuit
courts should have considered other means of interpretation.205 In
effect, the courts have applied the terms of LIHPRHA to HOPE, a
202

See supra notes 148 through 153 and accompanying text.
Id.
204
This analysis would lead to the examination of HUD policies regarding
the application of Section 4122 to projects opting out through HOPE. As
mentioned above, the Court mentioned HUD’s policies, but did not consider
them to govern the decision. Id. This analysis appears inconsistent. Choosing to
free HUD from state regulations that it does not deem restrictive would appear
beyond what the court was called upon to do.
205
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 743 (2004) “If, after application of
these principles of statutory construction, we conclude that the statute is
ambiguous, we may turn to legislative history. For the language to be considered
ambiguous, however, it must be susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation or more than one accepted meaning.” Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
203
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separate statute, absent statutory language or congressional records
explicitly addressing the relationship between the statutes.206 The
plain meaning approach is not appropriate when the court is
examining two separate federal statutory programs.
Nonetheless, the courts held that because LIHPRHA’s terms
incorporate all buildings opting out of federal affordability
programs today, these buildings also benefit from the Act’s
preemption provision. LIHPRHA provided HUD with guidance for
regulating all federal housing programs; therefore, all buildings
built before 1990 were LIHPRHA eligible.207 Congress, however,
subsequently ordered HUD to suspend further processing of
preservation applications that did not have approved action plans,
thereby rendering LIHPRHA dormant.208 Although LIHPRHA was
never expressly repealed, as evidenced by the fact that buildings
participating in preservation programs continue to receive funding
pursuant to agreements executed while the program was still
accepting new applications, technically no buildings remain
prospectively LIHPRHA eligible.209 For this reason, the courts’
206

See supra note 78 through 80 and accompanying text.
12 U.S.C. § 4119(1) (2005).
§ 4119(1) The term “eligible low-income housing” means any housing
financed by a loan or mortgage— (A) that is (i) insured or held by the
Secretary under section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act [12
USCS § 1715l(d)(3)] and receiving loan management assistance under
section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 [42 USCS § 1437f]
due to a conversion from section 101 of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965; (ii) insured or held by the Secretary and
bears interest at a rate determined under the proviso of section
221(d)(5) of the National Housing Act [12 USCS § 1715l(d)(5)]; (iii)
insured, assisted, or held by the Secretary or a State or State agency
under section 236 of the National Housing Act [12 USCS § 1715z-1];
or (iv) held by the Secretary and formerly insured under a program
referred to in clause (i), (ii), or (iii); and (B) that, under regulation or
contract in effect before February 5, 1988, is or will within 24 months
become eligible for prepayment without prior approval of the
Secretary.
207

Id.
208

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *13. HUD’s
inability to accept new preservation applications, execute new POAs or enforce
209
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application of the LIHPRHA preemption provision to buildings
opting out under HOPE is inappropriate, as there is no active
program for which the buildings may be deemed eligible. Since
1996, HUD has lacked the authority to accept new LIHPRHA
applications.210 It is illogical to suggest that, at LIHPRHA’s
creation, Congress intended that LIHPRHA should apply to
properties that had never participated in LIHPRHA because, in
1990, Congress had no reason to address non-participating
properties, which did not exist as a class until Congress ceased
funding mandatory LIHPRHA preservation in 1996. HUD’s own
policy before these cases was consistent with this approach.211
As the Supreme Court held in Cipollone, “[w]here Congress
explicitly preempts state law, Congress’s enactment of a provision
defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters
beyond that reach are not preempted.”212 As non-LIHPRHA
properties are not referenced in LIHPRHA’s express preemption
provision, such properties are beyond its reach. If the LIHPRHA
preemption provision were applied to non-LIHPRHA properties, it
is reasonable to assume that all LIHPRHA prepayment provisions
should apply as well. This includes requiring owners to issue a
LIHPRHA notice of intent and to submit and receive HUD
approval of a POA.213 It is counterintuitive to suggest that one
provision of LIHPRHA applies to owners when owners are not
required to meet any of the statute’s other prepayment
LIHPRHA’s provisions except as to owners already participating in LIHPRHA
prior to October 1, 1996 as sufficient reasoning for the holding that since “[t]he
Owners were never involved in the LIHPRHA Preservation Program, and never
operated under the LIHPRHA plan of action. Rather, the prepayment scheme
followed by the Owners is that embodied in [Section 219], permitting mortgage
prepayment without HUD approval, rather than LIHPRHA with its restrictions.”
Id. The court held that the preemption provision of LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. §
4122, does not govern and thus does not preempt the California notice and right
of first refusal statutes. Id.
210
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
211
Letter from Clare Harringan, Office of HUD General Counsel, to Judge
Lawrence K. Karlton, June 21, 2001 [hereinafter HUD Letter] (on file with
author).
212
Cipollone v. Liggett Groups, Inc. 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992).
213
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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requirements. Indeed, if the buildings that were the subjects of
review by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits were LIHPRHA eligible,
without explicit congressional language on point, LIHPRHA
would dictate that the owners of these buildings would be required
to submit findings of minimal tenant impact as a condition of
receiving HUD authorization to opt out.214 To argue, as the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits did, that a project is entitled to the benefits of
LIHPRHA (express preemption), but need not shoulder its burdens
(for example, detailed assurances that low-income tenants will not
be harmed) turns a reasonable interpretation of congressional intent
on its head. Indeed, as a slip opinion by a California Superior
Court referencing the holdings of both Forest Park and Topa
Equities recently noted, “Although LIHPRHA continues to apply
to properties participating prior to 1996, in effect the heart of
LIHPRHA has been eviscerated.”215 A cursory analysis of these
results seem incongruous or at the least unfair, thus requiring
further examination of the legislative history and purpose of both
statutes.216
214
215

Id.
College Gardens Preservation Committee v. Eugene Burger, slip op., at

3.
216

This is similar to holdings in various circuit courts in cases dealing with
the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 1201). While out of the
preemption context, it does provide a workable solution about when and how to
read congressional history and legislative purpose when dealing with absurd
results of a plain meaning interpretation. The following circuit courts held
against the plain language of the ADA, which states that an employer is required
to accommodate an individual who is “regarded as” disabled. See Kaplan v. City
of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 2003).
On the face of the ADA, failure to provide reasonable accommodation
to “an otherwise qualified individual with a disability” constitutes
discrimination. And, on its face, the ADA’s definition of “qualified
individual with a disability” does not differentiate between the three
alternative prongs of the “disability” definition. The absence of a stated
distinction, however, is not tantamount to an explicit instruction by
Congress that “regarded as” individuals are entitled to reasonable
accommodations. Moreover, because a formalistic reading of the ADA
in this context has been considered by some courts to lead to bizarre
results, we must look beyond the literal language of the ADA.
Id. at 1232 (citing Royal Foods Co., Inc. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102,
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The ambiguity created by a plain meaning approach to
interpreting the LIHPRHA preemption provision suggests that
courts should apply a clearer and more thorough interpretative
framework to the analysis of this provision by looking to statutory
purpose and legislative history to determine whether to apply the
LIHPRHA preemption provision to HOPE’s prepayment
provisions. The lack of congressional funding for LIHPRHA
should give rise to an analysis of available congressional history
and legislative purpose, which would serve to highlight the error of
applying the preemption provision to properties opting out under
HOPE. LIHPRHA’s legislative purpose and congressional intent in
this area dictate that the LIHPRHA preemption provision should
not be applied to HOPE’s provisions.217 This analysis has been
supported by a formal opinion of HUD, which, in lieu of relevant
congressional language, should be granted deference.
1. Analyzing the Legislative Purpose of LIHPRHA
Congressional hearings on LIHPRHA suggest that LIHPRHA
preemption is only applicable to LIHPRHA-eligible properties.218
Furthermore, there is no preemption language contained in HOPE,
the National Housing Act of 1934, the Emergency Low Income
Housing Preservation Act of 1987, or the regulation promulgated
by HUD that grants owners the right to prepay their mortgages.219
Through LIHPRHA, Congress demonstrated its understanding that
1108 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal citations omitted) (recognizing that a court must
look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would
lead to an absurd result). See also Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17
(8th Cir. 1999); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999);
Newberry v. E. Texas State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998).
217
These arguments are expanded versions of arguments presented to the
Sacramento, California Superior Court on behalf of the plaintiff, College
Gardens Preservation Committee, in the case of College Gardens Preservation
Committee v. Eugene Burger. See Letter Brief on the Applicability of LIHPRHA,
College Gardens Preservation Committee v. Eugene Burger, No. 03 AS02608
(Sac. Superior Court, Cal. Nov. 19, 2003) (on file with author).
218
See House Comm. Report, supra note 200.
219
For a discussion on the relationship between various federal housing
statutes, see supra Part II.
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it was free to add a preemption provision when it deemed one
necessary. Congress determined that a preemption provision was
required in LIHPRHA because the Act added substantial burdens
and cumbersome regulations to subsidized properties.220
Prior to its defunding, LIHPRHA was a comprehensive federal
preservation program that substantially restricted prepayments of
“eligible low-income housing.”221 Only a few properties could
satisfy LIHPRHA’s restrictive criteria for prepayment and
conversion to market-rate housing.222 In fact, the LIHPRHA
program functioned primarily to provide federally funded
incentives to preserve eligible properties.223 Preemption was an
integral part of the comprehensive LIHPRHA statutory scheme.
The purpose of Section 4122’s preemption provision was to
prevent states and localities from singling out LIHPRHA
participants for special and disadvantageous treatment that would
reduce the federal preservation incentives otherwise available
under the program.224
The congressional record, in providing for express preemption
of prepayment restrictions, demonstrates that Congress was
concerned with equitable treatment of private affordable housing
projects throughout the states and had no intention of abrogating
state procedural requirements as they applied to non-participating
properties.225 Restrictions by individual states would have proven
unnecessary and have created non-uniform procedures nationwide.
Further, investors seeking to develop federally subsidized
properties would have been able to choose where to develop based
not on need, but rather, on the number and form of state opt-out
provisions. Because the federal government abandoned projectsubsidized programs in 1996 when it reinstituted owners’
prepayment rights, it is reasonable to assume that the federalism
interests that were of concern at the time of LIHPRHA’s enactment
220

See House LIHPRHA Report, supra note 72; College Gardens
Preservation Committee v. Eugene Burger, slip op., at 3.
221
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
222
See Winkelman, supra note 66.
223
Id.
224
See House LIHPRHA Report, supra note 72.
225
Id.
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are no longer relevant. As such, courts should not second-guess
Congress’s decision not to add a preemption provision to HOPE.226
2. Reviewing HUD’s Interpretation of the LIHPRHA Preemption
Provision’s Applicability to Non-LIHPRHA Properties
Upon the enactment of LIHPRHA, Congress charged HUD
with administering the LIHPRHA program.227 In exercising this
mandate, HUD determined that the LIHPRHA preemption
provision does not apply to non-LIHPRHA properties.228 In the
agency’s opinion letter addressing this issue and related federal
preemption questions concerning California’s prepayment notice
statutes,229 HUD’s General Counsel explained that because
Congress ceased funding for new LIHPRHA action plans in 1996,
LIHPRHA presently applies only to those projects that received
LIHPRHA preservation incentives prior to 1996.230 Therefore,
state laws can be inconsistent with LIHPRHA only with respect to
projects that have already received preservation incentives and
226

United States v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189, 1194 (1982).
LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4101. (“General prepayment limitation (a)
Prepayment and termination. An owner of eligible low-income housing may
prepay, and a mortgagee may accept prepayment of, a mortgage on such housing
only in accordance with a plan of action approved by the [HUD]
Secretary. . . .”).
228
HUD Letter, supra note 211.
229
Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470 (holding that the
LIHPRHA preemption provision does not apply to four non-LIHPRHA
apartment developments).
230
HUD Letter, supra note 211.
The preemption provision in LIHPRHA at Section 232, 12 U.S.C. Sec.
4122, was intended to afford protection to owners of properties that
were, or are, operating under the LIHPRHA Preservation Program
(emphasis added). Section 4122(b) states that the section “shall not
prevent the establishment, continuing in effect, or enforcement of any
law or regulation of any State or political subdivision of a State not
inconsistent with the provision of this subchapter.” Thus, a state law
could not be inconsistent with the provision of LIHPRHA for an owner
who was never involved in the LIHPRHA Preservation Program and
never operated under a LIHPRHA plan of action.
Id. (emphasis in original).
227
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undertaken additional affordability restrictions.231 The HUD Letter
further stated that the express language of the LIHPRHA
preemption provision limits preemption to local laws that are
inconsistent with LIHPRHA.232 In addition to relying on the
limiting language of the LIHPRHA preemption provision, HUD
further reasoned that because “HUD does not have authority to
accept new preservation applications or to enter into new plans of
action, it has continued to implement and enforce the provisions of
LIHPRHA only as to those owners who were in the program prior
to the passage of HOPE [the successor statutory scheme] in
1996.”233
In United States v. Mead,234 the Supreme Court held that an
agency’s “permissible construction of [a] statute” that it is charged
with administering is entitled to “some deference,” even if the
agency’s interpretation of the statute is not rendered within a
public notice and comment rulemaking framework.235 Indeed, as
explained in Skidmore v. Swift,236 such agency interpretations are
“entitled to respect” to the extent they have the “power to
persuade.”237 Further, in Auer v. Robbins238 the Supreme Court
held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is
controlling unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”239 Like the agency interpretation at issue in Auer,
which was submitted in an amicus brief, HUD’s interpretation
regarding preemption in the Kenneth Arms case was submitted by

231

Id.
Id.
233
HUD Letter, supra note 211.
234
533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (finding that Customs letter “classification
ruling may at least seek a respect proportional to its power to persuade, and may
claim the merit of its writer’s thoroughness, logic and expertness, its fit with
prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight”).
235
Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
236
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
237
Id.
238
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
239
Id.
232
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letter brief at the court’s invitation.240 The agency’s interpretation
was not at issue in Kenneth Arms. Thus, like the agency
interpretation in Auer, “[t]here is simply no reason to suspect that
the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered
judgment on the matter in question.”241
For the foregoing reasons, future courts hearing preemption
challenges should question the continued application of
LIHPRHA’s preemption provision to owners opting out under
Section 219 of HOPE or other similar prepayment provisions.
B. Future Preemption Analysis and the Ninth Circuit’s
Approach
If courts continue to apply LIHPRHA’s preemption provision
to owners opting out under HOPE, courts should follow the Ninth
Circuit’s narrow “legal consequences” analysis.242 This approach is
240

Forest Park II v. Hadley, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076 (2002) (citing
HUD Letter Brief in Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *33).
241
Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. The Eighth Circuit in Forest Park, in a footnote,
cast aside Supreme Court precedent and found that the Court owes no deference
to the letter cited in Kenneth Arms. Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 733, n.6. The
Court distinguished the letter at issue from an official agency interpretation
resulting from official agency rulemaking procedures. Id. The Court cited the
Supreme Court case of Christensen v. Harris County, in which the Supreme
court found that a Department of Labor opinion letter taking the position that an
employer may compel the use of compensatory time only if the employee has
agreed in advance to such a practice was not due deference for the application of
a clear and unambiguous statute. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,
587 (2000).
In Christensen, however, the Supreme Court also found that “[a]n agency’s
opinion letter interpreting its own regulation is entitled to deference when
language of regulation is ambiguous.” Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588. The only
thing that is clear regarding LIHPRHA, its provisions, Congress’s refusal to
continue funding LIHPRHA programs, Congress’s enactment of an alternative,
and currently only prepayment option through budget Appropriation, is that the
application of HOPE and LIHPRHA is ambiguous. For a discussion on the
ambiguities created through a plain reading interpretation of the relationship
between LIHPRHA and HOPE, see supra Part V.
242
Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.
2003).
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consistent with established preemption jurisprudence and
congressional intent. The Eighth Circuit’s expansive “practical
effects” approach erroneously applies administrative law principles
to a preemption analysis and is inconsistent with congressional
intent.243
As past preemption cases dictate, there is a presumption against
preemption within traditional spheres of local police powers,
unless it can be shown that it is the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress to preempt state authority.244 Housing regulations, land
use restrictions, and zoning ordinances fall within the traditional
spheres of state and local police powers.245 While the Supremacy
Clause does not require a narrow or broad construction in response
to the presumption against preemption,246 the Supreme Court, in
Cipollone, recently held that the preemption provision at issue
required a narrow interpretation.247
The Eighth Circuit’s holding and its doctrine of preempting
regulations that have the practical effect of restricting or inhibiting
the prepayment of HUD-subsidized mortgages is inconsistent with
the presumption against preemption. Furthermore, absent any
guidance, the application of this approach may impede the ability
of state and local governments to preserve affordable housing
within the existing framework of the federal prepayment
scheme.248 A modest application of this holding would in effect
243

Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2003), reh’g and
reh’g en banc denied (2003).
244
See discussion supra Part III and accompanying notes.
245
Id.
246
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 544 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
247
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
248
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 734. The Eighth Circuit may have attempted
to limit this expansive interpretation of LIHPRHA’s preemptive scope, but its
language fell short of such a goal.
[N]ot . . . all state attempts at preserving existing federally subsidized,
low-income housing are preempted. Nothing in the federal statutes,
their legislative history, or their stated objectives indicates that states
are prohibited from instituting their own incentive plans or other
programs to preserve low-income housing within the framework of the
federal prepayment scheme. When, however, these state programs
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preempt all state and local preservation laws that inhibit the
realization of expectations by owners opting out or prepaying
Section 221(d)(3) or 236 mortgages.249 This language includes
limitations on the property owners’ returns and forced transfers of
properties to preservation owners, in addition to the procedural
requirements involved in the case.250 As the court succinctly stated,
a “further requirement imposed by a state statute would directly
interfere with Congress’s original intent of offering prepayment as
an incentive.”251 Therefore, even though the Eighth Circuit found
that the Minnesota notice requirements do not explicitly bar
prepayment, it nonetheless found that they had the effect of
restricting opt out and were consequently preempted.252
The Ninth Circuit held that LIHPRHA’s structure supports the
proposition that the “restrict or inhibit” language of Section 4122
was not intended to preempt state preservation laws that do not
explicitly place barriers on the prepayment of Section 221(d)(3)
and 236 mortgages.253 The court found that LIHPRHA’s
preemption provision requires a narrow construction and expressly
states that local laws are preempted “only to the extent that [they]
violate the provisions of this subsection.” 254 Further, the statute
limits preemption to local laws “inconsistent” with LIHPRHA.255
Congressional history suggests that the Ninth Circuit’s holding
is more in line with what Congress intended and that Congress in
place additional requirements on federal program participants, restrict
the exercise of the participants’ federally granted prepayment rights, or
create delays in the prepayment process, they are preempted.
Id.
249

Id. at 732 (noting that the effect of the state statute was to limit a right to
move to the market rates that Congress provided).
250
For discussion on various preservation laws and regulations, see supra
Part III.
251
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 733. Nonetheless, the law that provided the
incentive is not the law that provided the preemption provision—an
inconsistency the court failed to address. Id.
252
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 732.
253
Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.
2003).
254
LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4122.
255
Id.
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fact considered state preservation laws and did not intend to
preempt such laws.256 Statements from various House committees
illustrate that Congress intended LIHPRHA to work in conjunction
with state preservation laws; indeed, a House conference
committee specifically cited to a Maryland preservation law.257
The Maryland law noted by the conference committee was adopted
in 1989, the year before Congress enacted LIHPRHA.258 This state
law requires owners to provide notice to the local government and
to tenants at least one year before prepayment, which is more
comprehensive than the notice required by the Minnesota impact
statement law at issue in Forest Park.259 If the congressional
committee did not intend to preempt the Maryland law, then it
follows that Congress did not intend to preempt the Minnesota or
California laws, which were less far reaching.260
Further, LIHPRHA’s reporting requirements demonstrate that
Congress understood state and local efforts as a means of ensuring
256

Congressman Hoagland, sponsoring the amendment that became section
4122(b), described it as “narrowing the State and local law preemption language
in the bill so that the state and local laws that contradict this statute will be
preempted.” 136 CONG. REC. H6053-01, H6183 (daily ed. July 31, 1990). See
also S. REP. NO. 316, 101 Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 106 (June 8, 1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5763, 5868 (“Local task forces have also considered the
range of municipal responses (rent control, tax abatement, etc.) that can be taken
alone or in conjunction with a federal preservation solution . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
257
See H.R.CONF.REP. 101-943, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6070,
6171. (“In the event of prepayment, HUD would have several tools to protect
the existing tenants and assist the affected community in replacing the stock.
The tenant protections build upon provisions contained in the House bill as well
as in State laws such as the Maryland Assisted Housing Preservation Act.”).
258
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, tit. 9, §§ 101-114 (2003); see statutes cited
supra notes 93-94.
259
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, tit. 9-103(a)(1)-(5) (2005); see statutes cited
supra notes 93-94.
260
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, tit. 9, §§ 101-114 (2003); see statutes cited
supra notes 93-94. See also Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 287-88 (1987) (finding “significant” the fact that Congress was aware of
and acknowledged in debates existing similar state laws when enacting federal
law and “failed to evince the requisite ‘clear and manifest’ purpose to supersede
them”).
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an effective flow of information regarding prepayment and viewed
such local efforts as complementary to LIHPRHA. Throughout
LIHPRHA are requirements that the owner and HUD notify both
tenants and state or local government entities of all activities
leading up to prepayment.261 LIHPRHA thus encourages state and
local entities to use this information to assist tenants in preserving
affordable housing.262 These provisions evince Congress’s desire
to empower tenants and state and local governments to effect the
preservation purposes of the Act. In a 1999 Hearing Notice
provided to all affordable housing projects, HUD clearly supported
261

LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4102(b) (2005). In relevant part, the statute
provides:
The owner, upon filing a notice of intent under this section, shall
simultaneously file the notice of intent with the chief executive officer
of the appropriate State or local government for the jurisdiction within
which the housing is located and with the mortgagee, and shall inform
the tenants of the housing of the filing.
Id. § 4106(c). “The Secretary shall make any information provided to the owner
under subsections (a) and (b) of this section available to the tenants of the
housing together with other information relating to the rights and opportunities
of the tenants.” Id. § 4107(a)(2).
Each owner submitting a plan of action under this section to the
Secretary shall also submit a copy to the tenants of the housing. The
owner shall simultaneously submit the plan of action to the office of the
chief executive officer of the appropriate State or local government for
the jurisdiction within which the housing is located.
Id. § 4118:
The Secretary shall confer with any appropriate State or local
government agency to confirm any State or local assistance that is
available to achieve the purposes of this title and shall give
consideration to the views of any such agency when agency when
making determinations under this subchapter. The Secretary shall also
confer with appropriate interested parties that the Secretary believes
could assist in the development of a plan of action that best achieves
the purposes of this subchapter.
Id.
262
LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4107(a)(2) (“An appropriate agency of such
State of local government shall review the plan and advise the tenants of the
housing of any programs that are available to assist the tenants in carrying out
the purposes of this title.”).
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this position, explaining that “besides meeting the Federal
notification requirement, project Owners must also comply with
any State or local notification requirements.”263
There is a distinct legal difference between imposing a barrier
to prepayment and imposing rent control on formerly subsidized
buildings.264 Speculative owners may argue that differentiating
between the two destroys the intent of the preemption provision
because applying rent control post-opt out, from an owner’s
perspective, compels the same result as a prepayment barrier.265 By
opting out of a federal program, however, an owner changes the
essence of the particular building. For example, the owner is no
longer required to comply with certain federally mandated property
standards, the owner is no longer liable under certain federal laws,
and the tax structure of the investment is changed.266 The
legislative history of LIHPRHA suggests that, while Congress
intended to provide property owners with an opportunity to free
themselves from the increased oversight and potential liability
associated with participation in a federal housing program, it did
not intend to permit owners to free themselves from the historic
police powers of states and localities to regulate housing and land
use issues.
Therefore, LIHPRHA’s structure, notice requirement, and
legislative history do not demonstrate the clear and manifest
congressional intent required for Section 4122 to preempt state
notice laws.267 Conversely, they suggest congressional approval of
supplementary state preservation efforts, such as the Maryland

263

Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *10 (citing HUD
Housing Notice 99-36, Dec. 29, 1999).
264
Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2003), reh’g and
reh’g en banc denied (2003). See also Lifgren v. Yeutter, 767 F. Supp. 1473 (D.
Minn. 1991) (holding that the Preservation Act and regulations relating thereto
are not inconsistent with the borrower’s option to prepay at any time, but rather,
the Preservation Act and its regulations simply provide procedures that must be
followed in the event that a borrower evidences an intent to prepay).
265
Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732.
266
Winkelman, supra note 38, at 1160.
267
See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
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preservation statute.268
VI. RECOMMENDATION: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
SHOULD LOOK TO TRANSFER PROPERTIES TO PRESERVATION
OWNERS
Preservation of affordable housing is an economical and
efficient means of safeguarding housing for current and future lowincome residents.269 As the federal government continues to
abandon affordable housing programs, state and local governments
must look to preservation laws to maintain affordable housing or
face waves of homeless or displaced low-income tenants.270
Preservation policies offer security to current tenants facing
drastically increasing rents in units that have benefited from
subsidized rents for the past twenty years. Laws that encourage and
provide methods of transferring federally subsidized affordable
housing projects to non-speculative owners, such as the Illinois
Assisted Housing Preservation Act and the New York Tenant
Empowerment Act (Intro. No. 186), provide an optimal means of
preserving at-risk housing.271 The transfer of projects to tenantendorsed or tenant-controlled non-profit organizations, whose
purpose is to provide housing, not generate profit, will keep tenants
in their homes and preserve properties as future housing sources.272
268

MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, tit. 9-103(a)(1)-(5) (2005); see statutes cited
supra note 93-94. MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, tit. 9, §§ 101-114 (2003).
269
Grow, supra note 9, at 3. Given current funding concerns, the
development of new affordable housing units appears unlikely. Id.
270
Id.
271
Rather than providing notice of impending opt-out, these laws provide
long-term security to the tenants and their communities. Grow, supra note 9, at
3.
272
Galle, supra note 85, at 5. Obtaining both the necessary funds for
transfer and site control from private owners remains a difficult challenge for
state and local governments. Id. Some 150 states or localities have adopted
housing trust funds providing revenue to assist the preservation of affordable
homes. Id. Obtaining sufficient capital funds will usually require state or local
financial contributions, which may include formerly “federal” funds such as
Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, HOME Investment Partnership Program or
Community Development Block Grant funds. Id. Low-Income Housing Tax
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Legal and practical issues regarding these laws are untested, but
following the preemption analysis set forth in the cases regarding
other preservation laws, these laws should not be subject to federal
preemption because they do not “restrict or inhibit” prepayment, as
they apply after opt out.273 Illinois’s statute and the proposed New
Credit (LIHTC) is an indirect method of subsidizing low-income housing. See
132 Cong. Rec. S8146-8158 (daily ed. June 23, 1986) (explaining the legislative
intent of the LIHTC). See also DAYE, supra note 3, at 247-49. HOME
Investment Partnerships Program, U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev.,
Home Investment Partnerships Program (2004), at http://www.hud.gov/
offices/cpd/affordablehousing/programs/home/index.cfm. For a discussion on
the HOME Investment Partnership Act of 1990, see DAYE, supra note 3, at 24042. For a discussion on Community Development Block Grant program
(CDBG), see supra note 7.
Some states have dedicated some general revenues to maintaining
affordability in HUD-subsidized housing. Galle, supra note 85, at 6 (“For
example, in California the enacted budget for FY 2000 includes $6 million for a
broad purpose multifamily acquisition and rehabilitation program, with the first
priority for funding being the preservation of currently affordable units.”). On
the local level, San Francisco, for example, established the San Francisco
Redevelopment Agency (SFRA) to administer several million dollars of
redevelopment agency tax increment funds for a variety of uses, including grants
and below-market loans for nonprofit purchasers, pre-development assistance,
and tenant outreach, organizing, and technical assistance. Galle, supra note 85,
at 6. More information regarding SFRA available at http://www.sfgov.org/
site/sfra_index.asp.
Federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credits and tax-exempt bond allocations
may provide an important source of funds for nonprofit acquisitions. Galle,
supra note 85, at 6 (“California reserves 10 percent of its Low-Income Housing
Tax Credits for preservation. For several years in Massachusetts . . . 60 percent
of the state’s credits are allocated to large-scale projects with significant federal
resources.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). See generally Ammann,
supra note 8. Both state and municipal governments provide other capital or
debt subsidy measures. Galle, supra note 85, at 7 n.36, 37 (“Many state housing
finance agencies, including those in Maine, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and
Vermont, use their own budgets for low- or no-interest loans to promote
preservation purchases. These funds are used for costs of purchase, to
rehabilitate properties, to expand affordability, [and] to cover predevelopment
costs. . . . ”).
273
Grow, supra note 9, at 6; Galle, supra note 85, at 6; See Franzese, supra
note 10.
A constitutional taking issue exists with the application of these
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York City housing regulations are good examples of laws that
work to provide increased protections for current tenants.274
preservation laws. Grow, supra note 9, at 6. Although there have so far been no
such challenges to state or local purchase opportunity laws, the takings issue
appears fairly straightforward so long as just compensation in provided. Grow,
supra note 9, at 6 (citing Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (“The Fifth
Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking
without just compensation.”)). The federal Constitution prohibits takings for
public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. . . .”) Id.
Federal, state, and local regulatory action can result in a constitutional
taking of private property so long as it is for a valid public use and just
compensation is provided. Grow, supra note 9, at 6. So long as preservation
purchase opportunity laws are not mandatory or provide market value
compensation by setting transfer prices at appraised market value, they appear to
fall safely outside of the takings clause. Id. (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 625 (2001)) (“When a taking has occurred, under accepted
condemnation principles the owner’s damages will be based upon the property’s
fair market value . . . an inquiry which will turn, in part, on restrictions on use
imposed by legitimate zoning or other regulatory limitations.”).
A constitutional takings challenge to LIHPRHA was examined along these
lines. In Chancellor Manor v. United States, the Federal Circuit held that since
the Owners of federally subsidized affordable housing projects should have
known that HUD’s regulations regarding prepayment could be changed at any
time, and that their right to prepay their mortgages was not a property interest
protected by the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause. Chancellor Manor v. United
States, 331 F.3d 891, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The court remanded the case for a
more thorough factual inquiry in order to determine whether the plaintiffs could
“establish the existence of a regulatory taking under the Penn Central
standards.” Id. at 906. The court directed the lower court to address all Penn
Central factors including: (1) the extent to which HUD’s regulatory change
interfered with the Owners’ objective reasonable expectations; (2) the economic
impact of HUD’s regulatory change on the Owners; and (3) the nature of HUD’s
regulatory change. Id. at 906.
274
New York City Council Int. No. 186-2004 (“A Local Law to amend the
administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to creating a right of
first refusal and an opportunity to purchase.”). See Chen, supra note 10. These
laws still create the challenge for purchasers and public agencies to find or
provide the necessary funds. For a discussion on funding options, see Galle,
supra note 85. Ideas for such funding in New York include the creation of a
Housing Trust Fund, similar to the Federal Housing Trust Fund discussed. See
Chen, supra note 9.
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Additionally, these laws are good illustrations of why state and
local governments should feel secure in the face of a preemption
challenge.
Transfer laws seek to reinstitute a key “component of the
federal preservation policy for HUD-subsidized properties that the
federal government [has] abandoned since 1995—that preservation
is of sufficient importance to warrant restrictions on owner
conversion, so long as those restrictions are supported with marketvalue compensation.”275 Both the Illinois law and the New York
City regulation cover all properties with HUD-subsidized
mortgages when the owners threaten conversion, sale, or
disposition of properties.276 Both statutes create purchase rights
when an owner proposes to sell a property or terminate the existing
federal subsidy programs or restrictions.277 These rights provide
tenant associations or their designees the right to purchase,
recognizing that tenant associations are not always in the best
position to purchase.278 A valuation of the properties in question is
performed through multiple appraisals, and a specified resolution
procedure is available if an agreement on the property’s value
cannot be reached.279 Thus, these laws relieve the government of
275

See Grow, supra note 9, at 6. This principle still governs the federal
Rural Housing Services-subsidized multifamily inventory. 42. U.S.C. § 1742(c)
et. seq. (2004).
276
Illinois law now covers properties with HUD-subsidized mortgages,
properties with certain state-provided mortgages, properties with expiring or
terminative project-based Section 8 contracts, and properties with expiring rent
restrictions under the federally funded but state-administered Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit program. 310 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 60/3 (as amended, July
2004). Proposed New York City Council Int. No. 186-2004, Chap. 9, §26-801
et. seq.
277
310 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 60/5 (2004) (as amended by SB 2329, enacted
July 2004); Proposed New York City Council Int. No. 186-2004, §§ 26-805,
807.
278
310 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 60/5 (2004) (as amended by SB 2329, enacted
July 2004); Proposed New York City Council Int. No. 186-2004, §§ 26-805,
807.
279
310 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 60/7(b) (2004) (as amended by SB 2329, enacted
July 2004); Proposed New York City Council Int. No. 186-2004, § 26-804
(Appraisal Determination).
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the burden of maintaining housing projects, but encourage and
provide means for stabilizing losses of affordable housing units.
These preservation laws can survive a LIHPRHA preemption
challenge because they apply to buildings “following opt-out” of
federal housing programs.280 Notwithstanding anti-preemption
arguments, current tenants should look for ways to preserve current
affordable housing under the assumption that courts will continue
to apply the preemption provision. The Eighth Circuit’s expansive
doctrine is problematic, as a practical effect of forced transfer laws
may be to limit conversions.281 These transfer laws may limit the
ability of owners to realize speculative gains since the goal of such
preservation laws is to encourage owners to sell their properties to
preservation owners. However, nowhere does the language or
legislative history of LIHPRHA support the position that Congress
intended to displace all state and local power on housing and land
use issues.282 Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, these laws will
not be preempted, as they do not expressly “restrict or inhibit”
prepayment.283 State and localities are currently using procedural
requirements in conjunction with other forms of preservation laws;
however, in order to comply with possible federal preemption
issues, it may be wise to limit this practice and repeal current
procedural requirements.284 Even under the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis, procedural requirements may be interpreted as placing a
barrier to prepayment.285
The ironic conclusion is that preservation laws that limit
property owners’ returns on opting out (i.e., rent control) and aid or
force the transfer to preservation owners (under eminent domain
power) are more controversial than procedural requirements.286
280

See Franzese, supra note 10.
The practical effects test preempts laws that have the effect of restricting
owners from realizing profits from moving their building’s units to market rates.
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d 724. According to the Eighth Circuit, this would be an
attempt to circumvent the “restrict or inhibit” language of Section 4122. Id.
282
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d 1065.
283
Id.
284
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d 724.
285
For further discussion, see supra Part V.B.
286
See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
281
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This is one of the more absurd results of express preemption
provisions and the reason many scholars have called for the
cessation of congressional use of preemption provisions.287
Nonetheless, preservation laws that apply post-opt out will have
significant advantages in overcoming LIHPRHA preemption issues
and helping to provide “a decent home and suitable living
environment for every American family.”288
CONCLUSION
The preservation of project-based affordable housing is a vital
part of any housing program for low- and very-low-income
individuals. In the recent past, the federal government has
maintained preservation requirements in order to continue to
provide housing for America’s poorest residents. In the mid-1990s,
Congress, at the whim of changing national priorities, determined
that funds should be redirected toward the goal of balancing the
national budget.289 Congress subsequently enacted HOPE and
discontinued federal preservation requirements.290
State and local governments both before and after these federal
efforts have used preservation policies to provide homes for lowand very-low income tenants. As witnessed throughout the nation,
these policies continue to provide security to those fearing
impending notice of a drastic increase to market-rate rents.
Congress, in drafting LIHPRHA, recognized the crucial role of
states and localities in providing affordable housing. In LIHPRHA,
Congress provided that state and local preservation laws should not
be superseded by the Act. Nonetheless, because the burdens
imposed by LIHPRHA were heavy, Congress restricted the ability
of states and localities to place further burdens on properties with a
LIHPRHA “plan of action” by enacting the LIHPRHA preemption
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); see also Jordan Rose, Eminent
Domain Abuse: The Growing Threat to Private Property, 174 ARIZ. ISSUE
ANALYSIS, Aug. 16, 2002.
287
See generally Stabile, supra note 115.
288
National Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441.
289
See supra note 73 through 74 and accompanying text.
290
See supra note 75 through 77 and accompanying text.
THE
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provision.
Legislative history dictates that Congress intended for
LIHPRHA’s benefits, including its preemption provision, to be
extended to those properties accepting the burdens of LIHPRHA.
Therefore, buildings opting out under alternative prepayment
schemes, such as HOPE, were not intended be the beneficial
recipients of LIHPRHA incentives, including Section 4122. The
buildings at issue in Forest Park291 and Topa Equities292 opted out
of Section 236 affordability restrictions through HOPE’s
prepayment provisions, and therefore, should not have been
afforded the benefit of LIHPRHA preemption. The analysis of both
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits overlooked a basic manifestation of
congressional intent as determined through rules of statutory
construction endorsed by the Supreme Court.
In the event that courts continue to apply LIHPRHA’s
preemption provision to affordable housing properties opting out
under alternative prepayment schemes, they should apply the Ninth
Circuit’s narrow approach. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and
analysis accord with established preemption jurisprudence and are
more aligned with congressional intent, as determined through
LIHPRHA’s structure and legislative history. The Eighth Circuit’s
expansive “practical effects” approach erroneously applies
administrative law principles to a preemption analysis and is not in
line with explicit congressional intent. These divergent
interpretations possess the potential to further reduce the
availability of housing to the detriment of elderly and low-income
tenants. Even though the federal government has given up on these
tenants, the federal courts should not inhibit local governments
from working for their benefit.

291
292

Forest Park, 336 F.3d 724.
Topa Equities, 342 F.3d 1065.

